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 i 
ABSTRACT  
Belief affects behavior and rhetoric has the potential to bring about action. 
This paper is a critical content analysis of the ideology and rhetoric of key 
Islamist intellectuals and the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, as stated on the 
website http://english.hizbuttahrir.org. The responses of specific Muslim 
Reformers are also analyzed. The central argument underlying this analysis 
centers on the notion that such Islamist ideology and its rhetorical delivery could 
be a significant trigger for the use of violence; interacting with, yet existing 
independently of, other factors that contribute to violent actions. In this case, a 
significant aspect of any solution to Islamist rhetoric would require that Muslim 
Reformers present a compelling counter-narrative to political Islam (Islamism), 
one that has an imperative to reduce the amount of violence in the region. 
Rhetoric alone cannot solve the many complicated issues in the region but we 
must begin somewhere and countering the explicit and implicit calls to violence 
of political Islamist organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir seems a constructive step.  
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
For the thirty victims of the Park Hotel suicide massacre  
on March 27, 2002 in Netanya, Israel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
OVERVIEW………………………………………………………………………1 
 
CHAPTER 
 
            1    THEORETICAL & METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE…..……6 
 
  Methodology……………………………………………………..11 
 
 2.    ISLAMISM………………………………………………………….15 
 
  Definition of Islamism…………………………………………...15 
 
  Modern Day Islamist Impact………………………………….…16 
   
  Violent Islamism…………………………………………………18 
 
  Uncreated Nature of the Quran…………………………………..26 
 
  Doctrine of Abrogation…………………………………………..29 
 
 3.    A BRIEF HISTORY OF ISLAM…………………………………...33 
 
  Mu’tazilite/Ash’arite Struggle (ninth century)…………………..33 
 
  Islamist Ideology…………………………………………………39 
 
  Short-Lived Modern Reforms……………………………………43 
 
  Muslim Brotherhood……………………………………………..49 
 
 4.    Modern Middle East History………………………………………..54 
 
 5.    Islamic Law…………………………………………………………58 
 
  Hermeneutics within Islam………………………………………62 
 
  Ijtihad - Independent Reasoning…………………………………64 
 
  Ijtihad closure…………………………………………………....68 
 
  HT and hermeneutics………………………………………….....73 
iv 
CHAPTER               
             Page 
 
 6.    Islamists……………………………………………………………..78 
 
  Islamist Syed Abul ala Mawdudi………………………...………79 
   
  Islamist Sayyid Qutb……………………………………………..80 
 
  Dr. Fadl - Before and After……………………………….……...87 
   
  Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)……………….………94 
 
 7.    Muslim Reformers………………………………..………………..104 
 
  American Islamic Forum for Democracy……………...……….109 
 
  The Quilliam Foundation………………………………….……112 
 
  Reformist versus Islamist tenets for Muslim Identity...………...119 
 
 8.    Conclusion…………………………………………………………123 
 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Overview  
The reflection that what we believe is not merely what we formulate and subscribe 
to, but that behaviour is also belief, and that even the most conscious and 
developed of us live also at the level on which belief and behaviour cannot be 
distinguished, is one that may, once we allow our imagination to play upon it, be 
very disconcerting. – T.S. Eliot 
 Islamist ideology and its rhetoric is considered to be a significant 
contributor to the deployment of violence and my ultimate goal in this thesis is to 
have a small part in reducing the amount of violence in the Near East, hereafter 
referred to as the Middle East. Consequently, in this thesis I analyze the rhetoric 
and ideological claims of the English language website of a key Islamist 
organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hizb ut-Tahrir (hereafter referred to as HT) was 
selected for scrutiny because: it has members worldwide that are estimated in the 
millions; they have a global reach through their websites and literature they 
distribute on college campuses that is primarily in English and Arabic but also in 
Turkish, German, Urdu, Dutch, French, Danish, Spanish. Further, they have 
headquarters in several countries along with the export of HT recruits back to 
their respective home or familial countries (Malik, 2004). As such HT are viewed 
as key proponents of the rhetoric of Islamist ideology that fuels violent Islamism; 
that is, HT propagates violence. Indeed HT have been banned from participating 
in many Arab/Muslim governments throughout the Middle East for their 
subversive ideology and activity (BBC News, 2009). However, to understand the 
rhetoric and ideological claims deployed by HT, it is necessary to appreciate the 
2 
connection of Islamic theology and the ideology that forms the foundational 
beliefs or positions of the Islamist intellectuals that inform HT’s position. 
Equally, any discussion of Islamist ideology must consider the position of the 
Muslim Reformers (hereafter referred to as Reformers) and what they have done 
to challenge the dominance of Islamist discourses within Islam, given that these 
discourses have led to forms of action as detailed by Whine (2006). Some 
examples of such action include the more notable HT members include Salih 
Sarriya who tried to assassinate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the assassins of 
Syrian cleric Muhammad Amin Yakan, the Mike’s Place suicide bombers who 
killed three and injured 50 in Tel Aviv among many others (see pages 26 and 27). 
In addition, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi was reported to have been a member of HT. 
Zarqawi was a well known terrorist who was responsible for terrorist activities 
including the Madrid bombing in 2004, where 191 people were murdered and 
1,800 were injured (Hamilos, 2007), the bombing of Shiite worshippers in Iraq 
that same year, a suicide attack in Basra, a total of four different attacks, is also 
reported to have been a part of HT (Teslik, 2006). Steven Brooke in the Weekly 
Standard says “While in Jordan he [Zarqawi] also associated with Hizb ut Tahrir, 
an angry, anti-Semitic conclave devoted to the restoration of Islamic rule” (Leiken 
& Brooke, 2004).  
 It is important to acknowledge that violent Islamism is one version of 
Islam, but also to appreciate that their discourses are fairly dominant, widespread 
and widely publicized. Robert Hefner in speaking of the struggle between a 
Democratic form of Islam and Islamism says, “The rivalry seen here in Indonesia 
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between a civil Islam and an anti-democratic regimist Islam is illustrative of a line 
of contestation widespread in today’s Muslim world” (Hefner, 2001 p. 509). 
Islamism is considered what Hefner refers to as the anti-democratic regimist 
version of Islam.   
Since the West cannot speak for Islam, it is essential that Muslims 
speaking for the majority of Muslims challenge the inherent power that resides 
within Islamist ideology. My target audience is Muslim Reformers and I urge 
them to reach out to Muslim youth in the United States and Europe to provide a 
positive alternative to Islamism and engaging them before they are recruited by 
organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir. Ultimately the counter-narrative must be 
initiated and disseminated by Muslim Reformers to influence Western youth who 
I argue could otherwise be recruited by Islamist organizations that communicate a 
narrative that places the blame of Islam’s struggles at the feet of the West. 
There are many economic, political, military, and socio-cultural problems 
that must be addressed to provide an enduring solution to violent Islamism. 
Certainly it will take more than rhetoric to solve the many complicated issues in 
the region yet we have to begin somewhere. Indeed, an investigation into the 
rhetoric of Islamism could provide a fuller understanding of one key element in 
the cycle of violence enabling a strategic positive displacement or counter-
narrative mediated by Muslim Reformers to mitigate the violence. Taking this 
perspective, my approach focuses on the role of ideology as a key element that 
has been enacted in Islamist rhetoric to impel violence, beginning with a 
theological interpretation that produces an ideology that enables powerful 
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interpretations of the Quran and Islamic law to remain in the hands of a select 
few. Thus my analysis primarily focuses on a key theological argument in Islam, 
the ideological practices that arise from this position, and the manner in which it 
is communicated.  
 While the focus of my analysis is on Islamist intellectuals, HT and a 
Reformer-led counter-narrative, I do not deny Western influence upon Islamism; 
the West has had an impact upon violent Islamist ideology and there has been a 
political response to this in some Islamic societies. However, I have chosen not to 
address what some refer to as Western imperialism due to my specific focus on 
ideology and rhetoric combined with a lack of space to do so. Equally, many 
conflicts have occurred in the Middle East that arguably have nothing to do with 
the West (see page 13). Thus, while I acknowledge politics and economics have 
contributed to some of the instability in the region, my focus is on ideology. 
Consequently, although I am unable to provide a solution to all the problems that 
perpetuate violent Islamism with this specific focus, I believe my thesis 
contributes to a small piece of the solution. 
 I include a necessarily brief historical discussion of modern Middle East 
history, Islamic Law, Islamism and Reformers to critically consider the power 
structure of Islamist ideology and to address how this ideology has become a 
powerful discourse even though this view is not representative of what he says is 
an “overwhelming majority of  Muslims” (Arkoun, p.18, 2003).  
 In chapter one I provide my theoretical and methodological perspective to 
investigate the modern day Islamist impact and provide a working definition of 
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Islamism. In chapter two I provide my methodology, and discuss two primary 
Islamist doctrines: the doctrine of abrogation and the uncreated nature of the 
Quran. I then differentiate between Islamism and violent Islamism. In chapter 
three I discuss a brief history of Islam, include the Mu’tazilite/Ash’arite struggle, 
Islamist ideology, short-lived modern day reforms and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In chapter four I continue the historical discussion into modern Middle East 
history. In chapter five I discuss Islamic law, which necessarily includes 
hermeneutics within Islam and ijtihad, also known as independent reasoning. In 
chapter six I discuss Islamism - several Islamist intellectuals and the Islamist 
organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. In chapter seven, I discuss Muslim Reformers 
including the American Islamic Forum for Democracy and the Quilliam 
Foundation. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of Muslim identity. 
My conclusion then analyzes the entire discussion and I provide policy 
recommendations to ensure Islamism does not become the prevailing majority 
discourse. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical & Methodological Perspective 
 Belief affects behavior. If I believe something to be true, I will act as if 
that is true. Ideology then plays a very powerful role in affecting output, or 
behavior. Bad belief does not necessarily lead to bad behavior but it certainly 
creates the conditions that allows for it. Applying this to a discussion of Islamism 
(i.e., defined as political Islam) is of critical importance for Islam and the world 
and it will be argued that caustic ideology quite often leads to bad behavior 
(Whine, 2006). 
 Muslim Reformers at the very least should publicize the stories of men 
like Hassan Butt and Noman Benotman, former Islamists who have renounced 
violence. Public acknowledgement of these is ideal since awareness of such 
examples will continue to chip away at the ideological underpinnings of Islamism. 
Indeed, Benotman wrote an open letter to Osama bin Laden urging him to re-
examine the hermeneutical approach of al Qaeda and violent Islamism and to go 
back to the Islamic scholars to determine if what they are doing is correct. 
Benotman said in his open letter to Osama bin Laden 
In urging you to halt your violence and re-consider your aims and 
strategy, I believe I am merely expressing the views of the vast 
majority of Muslims who wish to see their religion regain the 
respect it has lost and who long to carry the name of ‘Muslim’ with 
pride. (Benotman, 2010 - 
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http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/10/an_open_letter_to
_osama_bin_laden)  
I agree with Benotman and Mohamad Arkoun that Islamism is not the majority 
view of ordinary Muslims (Arkoun, 2003, p. 19), however, unless clearly 
demonstrated otherwise, Islamists will continue to control the public discourse 
(Anderson, 2005).  
 I support a moderate approach to religion where one can disagree with any 
religion but still co-exist peacefully as promoted by Reformers. Although certain 
rhetorical structures within Islamist ideology pays lip service to peaceful co-
habitation, they mean something quite different where non-Muslims are allowed 
to live as second class citizens in their ideal society and must pay the jizya (tax) 
for the privilege of not converting to Islam. On their English website HT says 
their method for carrying the message of Islam to unbelievers is Jihad until the 
unbelievers embrace Islam or pay the Jizya (tax) and submit to Islamic rule and 
quote verses from the Quran saying  “And fight them on until there is no more 
strife and there prevails the Deen [faith] of Allah everywhere" (8:39) and "Until 
they pay the Jizyah [tax] with willing submission and feel themselves subdued 
(9:29).” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010c). HT’s ideology promotes a supremacist brand of 
Islam where all non-Muslims must submit to Islamism. However, the Quran 
(2:256) also says “Let there be no compulsion in religion.”  Reformers can 
highlight this latter text and others like it as authoritative. Yet Reformers cannot 
simply remove a caustic ideology only since nature abhors a vacuum but they 
must replace Islamism with an authoritative, comprehensive and compelling 
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counter-narrative. To illustrate this point, in 1967 when Israel defeated Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq’s armies in six days, Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s secular pan-Arabism, the then prevailing ideology at the time was 
defeated along with the military defeat of his army. As a result, Islamism filled 
the void that was vacated by the overwhelming defeat of pan-Arabism (The 
Middle East Media Research Institute, 2008). Najjar (2004 p.198) claims the fall 
of Nasser’s pan-Arabism opened a space for Islamists to present themselves as the 
only alternative to the existing order. Therefore, Islamists were then able to argue 
that secularism had no solutions and Islamism was the only solution to restore the 
caliphate and defeat the West. We see this today on the “Khilafah” [caliphate] 
website maintained by HT that presents Islam as “a challenge to the current chaos, 
inequality, despotism and international disorder - all a consequence of Western 
liberalism (Capitalism).” (The Khilafah.com Editorial Team, 2008)  This narrative 
places the blame of all the world’s ills solely at the feet of the West and Western 
ideologies and seeks to fill this need through the return to a global caliphate that 
was dissolved upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 (Cleveland, 2009). I 
will argue that if Muslim Reformers can provide a counter-narrative that is 
authoritative, compelling and comprehensive, thus allowing for an inclusion with 
Modernity, then this could displace the destructive narrative of violent Islamism.  
 However, this counter-narrative can only become authoritative if it comes 
from within the Muslim community and certainly not from the West, as Islamists 
will immediately dismiss this as un-Islamic and an attempt to subvert Islamic 
society. I differentiate very markedly between Islam and Islamism as my primary 
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concern is with the caustic ideology espoused by violent Islamism that begins 
with Islamist ideology, and that this can lead to violent action.  
 Many in the media, public policy and academia use the terms radical 
jihadist, Islamic extremist, and even Islamists.  I avoid the use of the former 
terms; however, I utilize the latter term Islamist to refer to political Islam and the 
desire for a global caliphate. There are those who use the former terms in the 
same sense; however, I avoid these entirely because they are loaded and do not 
further the conversation. Jihad has two different meanings and ordinary Muslims 
can utilize the version that emphasizes a struggle within one’s soul versus the 
definition utilized by HT that emphasizes a violent struggle against the unbeliever 
(see Jihad in Islam; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2008a). Additionally, Karen Hughes, advisor 
to former President George W. Bush requested the Bush Administration stop 
using the terms “Islamic extremists” and “radical jihadists” because Muslims 
view this as an attack on their faith and that this is the type of world Osama bin 
Laden wants them to have (Associated Press, 2010).  
 I also develop the idea that Islamism has existed for centuries and that 
one’s interpretation of Islam necessarily will impact ones behavior. I emphasize 
hermeneutics as critical to my thesis and the several differences in interpretation 
between the Islamist and the Reformer as noted by Rahman (1980) and Codd 
(1999). This hermeneutical struggle is not unique to Islam as other religions share 
the same struggles in principle as illustrated by the several differences between 
orthodox and liberal Christianity, c.f. The Jesus Seminar and orthodox Christian 
philosophers/theologians (Copan, 1998).   
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 There are several conflicts in the Middle East that have seemingly little to 
do with the West or Israel but are merely territorial, religious or political conflicts 
confined to the region. For example, Afghanistan refusing to give up its claim of 
Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province; Pakistan and India's territorial dispute; 
Pakistan and Iran’s dispute over territorial waters in the Arabian sea; Iran’s claim 
of supervision over Iraq’s holy shrines; Iran’s dispute with Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan over the Caspian Sea; Iran’s ethnic cleansing 
of Arabs in its oil rich Khuzestan province; Qatar’s issue with the Saudis over the 
oil rich area of Khor al-Udaid; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s differences over oil 
resources; Jordan’s claim to control the Saudi province of Hejaz in which Mecca 
and Medina reside; Yemen’s inability to define its border with Oman along the 
Gulf of Hauf; both Syria and Iraq’s claim on the Turkish province of Iskanderun; 
Egypt annexing portions of Sudan; Egypt’s occasional conflicts with Libya; 
Libya’s territorial disputes with Chad, Sudan and Tunisia; and Algeria, Morocco 
and Mauritania’s struggle over the Western Sahara to name a few. In addition, we 
would have to explain the Iran/ Iraq war in the 80s (Taheri, 2007). There is no 
dispute that the United States supported Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war as we 
pursued an anti-communism approach but it would be a major stretch to blame the 
United States for the start and continuance of their war. At some point, 
Islamic/Arab countries must take responsibility for their own actions and not lay a 
casus belli between Arab/Muslim countries at the feet of the West.  
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Methodology 
My thesis is a critical analysis of the content attributed to key Islamist 
intellectuals with a particular focus on the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(HT), their ideology and rhetoric along with the response of Muslim Reformers.  
 I utilized a critical approach for several reasons. Critical Theory initially 
emerged due to a frustration with inherent power structures within academics. 
Zou and Trueba (2002, p. 88) say “Impressed by critical theory’s dialectical 
concern with the social construction of experience, [the Frankfurt School] came to 
view their disciplines as manifestations of the discourses and power relations of 
the social and historical contexts that produced them.” My concern here is 
primarily with discourses and the historical contexts that produced them vis-à-vis 
Islamism, specifically those companions who were closest to the Prophet 
Muhammad whose interpretation of the holy texts are still considered valid for 
today by Islamists - regardless of the current social and cultural context. In 
addition, Critical Theory acknowledges that interpretation is inherently 
problematic and linked to issues of power, aiding insights into current social 
reality, and for some scholars enabling the identification of actors to change the 
current social reality and providing clear norms for criticism and achievable 
practical goals for social transformation (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
In this particular instance, I utilize Critical theory and apply the actors as Muslim 
Reformers and ultimately Muslim American youth who seek to achieve practical 
goals for social transformation.  
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 Critical theorists argue one cannot separate hegemony from ideology. 
Although it is my understanding most scholars focus their examination of 
domination within class, race, gender or economics, I apply this same rigor to 
religion and religious claims here as another form of domination. Zou and Trueba 
(2002, p. 93) say  
If hegemony is the larger effort of the powerful to win the consent 
of their ‘subordinates,’ then dominant or hegemonic ideology 
involves the cultural forms, the meanings, the rituals, and the 
representations that produce consent to the status quo and 
individuals’ particular places within it. 
Further, “Ideology vis-à-vis hegemony moves critical inquirers beyond simplistic 
explanations of domination that have used terms such as propaganda to describe 
the way media, political, educational, and other socio-cultural productions 
coercively manipulate citizens to adopt oppressive meanings.” Again, my focus is 
not on socio-cultural issues; however, I do apply these same principles of 
hegemony to ideology by way of religious claims and definitions as mediated by 
Islamists.  
 Although I would have preferred to conduct several interviews with both 
Islamists and Muslim Reformers, given the already sensitive nature of the issue, I 
decided it best to ground my research in content analysis of both Islamists and 
Muslim Reformers and depended upon literature and current reports from key 
organizations and individuals. 
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 I develop a critical theory approach on Islamist discourse and challenge 
the belief that Islamist ideology is the majority discourse of orthodox Muslims. I 
argue, from a critical perspective, that one can maintain a Muslim identity and 
concurrently have a moderate approach to governance all of which is contingent 
upon ones hermeneutical interpretation of the holy texts. As such, I spend a fair 
amount of time on ijtihad (independent reasoning) as this discussion determines 
whether ordinary Muslims must depend upon Islamic law and therefore practical 
action as defined by those closest to the Prophet Muhammad (hereafter referred to 
as Muhammad) and Muslim scholars, or whether ordinary Muslims can employ 
their own reason to make room for modernity. Ijtihad is crucial given that if 
Muslims cannot employ their own reasoning, then they would necessarily be 
dependent upon whoever is in authority telling them how the Shari’a ought to be 
interpreted and thus lived out. Further, depending upon how those in authority are 
interpreting the Shari’a could potentially lead to violent action and the Muslim 
would be compelled to obedience regardless of whether the interpretation is 
reflective of Islamic injunctions. So a Muslim could engage in violent activity 
where no such Islamic injunction exists. 
My approach is grounded in the analysis of primary source materials from 
HT, Sayyid Qutb and Dr. Fadl. As my Arabic is basic and it takes me a fair 
amount of time with an Arabic dictionary to translate, I depend upon English 
translations of those primary source materials from the Arabic. However, HT’s 
work I refer to is in English as they have official English websites for each 
country they are located in http://www.hizb-america.org/ - (scroll to bottom of 
14 
site). I also ground primary source material from Reformers as translated by the 
Middle East Media Research Institute along with primary English language 
source material from the Quilliam Foundation and the American Islamic Forum 
for Democracy.  
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Chapter 2 
Islamism 
Definition of Islamism  
Islamism is defined as political Islam, in which Islam is a religion and a 
political system that necessarily includes the desire for a global caliphate in which 
all of humanity, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, must submit. This Islamic 
caliphate is ruled by the caliph who is compelled to submit to the interpretation of 
the holy texts as interpreted by what the religious authorities believe Allah has 
commanded (The Khilafah.com Editorial Team, 2008). Because the Islamist 
organization HT is so clear in what the ideal Islamist state will look like, they help 
us to understand the necessary components of Islamism through their English 
website. They urge an Islamic Revivalism through the ideology of Islamism that 
combines both idea and methodology together which means their version of Islam 
would be implemented in Islamic countries first then throughout the entire world. 
The ideology is Islam as defined by HT that governs all the affairs of the Ummah 
[Muslim community] and provides solutions to all of life’s problems - personal 
and public. They seek to confine their methodology of establishing Islam (as 
defined by HT) in one or several countries until they are able to establish it 
worldwide. HT says “the Islamic state would be founded and she would grow 
naturally until she engulfs all the Islamic countries first, then she would carry 
Islam to the rest of the world, because it is her Message and because it is an 
eternal and universal Message for all mankind.” (see Hizb ut-Tahrir Party 
Structure; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2008a).  
16 
We immediately see not just a desire for a regional caliphate but a movement 
toward their version of Islam that would first take over all Islamic countries, then 
all non-Islamic countries later. Note this particular Islamist organization does not 
claim the use of force in this particular instance to arrive at this end but they 
merely focus on Islam as an ideology. Nonetheless, below I show how they also 
deploy jihad to mean initiating fighting against infidels even in the absence of 
aggression (see page 24).  
Modern Day Islamist Impact  
 Until recently, Islamists did not have much political power but the rise of 
Islamist parties such as Hezbollah and Hamas have demonstrated that Islamism is 
no longer merely shaping public opinion on the “Muslim street,” but is indeed 
shaping public policy through direct involvement in the political process. Hamas 
overwhelmingly won legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in early 
2006 (Wilson, 2006). Although Hezbollah does not currently have a majority in 
the Lebanese government, they are being financed by the Iranian government and 
maintain a separate, well established infrastructure and military (Agence France 
Presse, 2008), and have often been referred to as a state within a state (Frontline 
World, 2003). This gives Hezbollah a very real impact upon Lebanese politics 
even as the minority party.  Hezbollah also has a very real everyday practical 
impact upon Lebanese affairs through their separate military as illustrated by the 
2006 war with Israel along with the social services they provide to the Lebanese. 
One cannot travel very far or have an impact upon local or national politics in 
Lebanon without encountering Hezbollah. 
17 
One can also make a good case that if The Muslim Brotherhood submitted 
all the required information to the Egyptian government to function as a political 
party and were allowed to participate in elections, they would win many seats, if 
not take over a majority of Egypt’s 454 legislative seats (Khoury 2010). Farr 
(2008) says “If free elections were held [in Egypt], the Muslim Brotherhood 
would very probably win” (p. 27).  Further, the al Qaeda inspired Islamist group 
Al Shabaab has sought to take over the government of Somalia and has taken over 
key cities in Somalia along with nearly overtaking the capitol city (Hussein, 
2010).  
 I am concerned that there is a trend toward Islamism that for the most part 
has until recently been received poorly in the Arab/Muslim world. Susser (2003) 
says on the ruins of Nasserism, Islamists offered a supposedly authentic route to 
modernity minus secularism. He mentions the ayatollahs of Iran, the Islamist 
inspired military regime in Sudan and the Taliban in Afghanistan as that of 
repeated Islamist failures. He quotes Isam Ikrimawi in al-Quds al-arabi who said 
“The Islamists offered no realistic policy alternatives other than a totalitarian 
vision of their own.” (2003, P.5) Since this piece was published in 2003, violent 
Islamists have gained more inroads into Islamic communities as noted, and I am 
concerned this trend will continue and spread to other Arab/Muslim communities 
where the acceptance of the ideology along with the acceptance of the social 
services from Islamist organizations will become more prevalent. As Islamists 
further this type of approach, their ideology could take over as the dominant 
discourse stifling all other discourses and Muslim identities where ultimately a 
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Muslim can only be a “true” Muslim if they adhere to the Islamist interpretation 
of the holy texts as understood by those closest to Muhammad and interpreted by 
Islamism. 
Violent Islamism   
 If the definition of Islamism I have provided is an accurate one, then it 
follows to define violent Islamism as the ideology that agrees with the same ends 
of the Islamist who seeks a global caliphate but adds the use of violence as a 
method to achieve this same desired end. What the United States Military 
Academy calls Jihadi ideology I refer to as violent Islamism yet we agree on what 
the end goal is for Islamism, namely, the establishment and governance of Islamic 
state(s) based upon Shari’a law, an Islamic caliphate as understood by the first 
generations of Muslims closest to Muhammad (McCants, Brachman, & Felter, 
2006). However, where my argument goes further than the U.S. Military 
Academy is that non-violent Islamism provides the grounds for the intellectual 
foundation for individuals to transition very easily from Islamism into violent 
Islamism. I detail several examples of this later on. Again, there may be those 
who claim to be part of an organized religion that commit violent acts but the 
critical difference is if the violence is done in the name of a particular religion. 
What we should pay attention to is if someone claims to be a part of a religion and 
commits the act of terrorism in the name of a particular religion (bold added for 
emphasis). And further, if done in the name of a religion, then we must examine if 
those within the religion in question repudiate that person versus promote and 
honor them. 
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 HT protests any claims that they partake in or even promote violence, 
however there is much evidence that contradicts this claim. The BBC’s 
Newsnight found HT’s website promotes “racism and anti-Semitic hatred, calls 
suicide bombers martyrs, and urges Muslims to kill Jewish people.” (BBC News, 
2003). On HT’s English website they have a book titled “Jihad in Islam” in which 
they refer to jihad as having been distorted by the West. They say  
the West resorted to distorting the concept of Jihad and started to 
spread among the Muslims, through some of the scholars who had 
been beguiled, that Jihad was merely a struggle against the soul 
and to repel aggression rather than initiate fighting against the kufr 
[infidel] so that they may embrace Islam, because there is no 
compulsion in religion. (see Jihad in Islam; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2008a) 
So, according to HT, the undistorted nature of jihad is not merely a struggle 
against the soul but necessarily includes the initiation of fighting and repelling 
aggression with whom they define as infidels until they embrace Islam. As 
mentioned earlier, I do not use the term jihadist because jihad can be interpreted 
as a struggle within one’s soul. 
In another HT book Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir they clearly describe the 
proactive nature of jihad. HT says  
they interpreted jihad as being a defensive rather than an offensive 
war, thus contradicting the reality of jihad. Jihad is a war against 
anyone who stands in the face of the Islamic Da’awa [call to 
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preach and propagate Islam], whether he is a belligerent or 
otherwise. 
In other words, the aim of HT’s Jihad is to remove every obstacle by force if 
necessary that stands in the face of the Islamic Da’awa (see The Concepts of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2008a). Although the Catholic Church and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are two of many examples of religious groups that urge their members 
to spread the word, the difference is they do not urge the use of force against 
anyone who stands in the way of their proselytizing. HT teaches otherwise by 
using rhetoric such as jihad being an offensive war against anyone, including non-
belligerents if they stand in the way of their version of proselytizing. 
Further, in HT’s The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilizations they say 
Those saying Islam is a deen of peace deny offensive jihad 
i.e. initiating fighting with the disbelievers. They confirm 
the defensive war and deny the offensive war (qital ut-
talab) i.e. initiating the attack. Some of them believe there 
is no necessity for this matter, as it is possible to overcome 
the material obstacles and convey the da’wa to disbelievers 
without colliding with these obstacles, by using the 
internet, media, books, leaflets, building mosques and 
Islamic centres in the heart of the countries of disbelievers, 
and live contacts with individuals to make them enter the 
deen of Allah. They claim that this takes the place of 
offensive war. This view collides with the texts of the 
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Book, Sunnah and Ijmaa Us-Sahabah that all command that 
we initiate fighting against them, even if they do not initiate 
against us, if they do not accept Islam or pay the jizyah and 
submit to the rule of Islam. These texts are not reasoned 
with the reason (illah) that Jihad is only obliged in the 
situation of inability to convey verbally. (Al-Khilafah 
Publications, 2002) 
 HT’s rhetoric urges followers to initiate fighting with unbelievers, and not 
to interpret jihad as merely a propagation of Islam saying that view contradicts 
what their holy texts clearly teach, namely, initiating fighting with unbelievers 
unless they either submit to Islam or pay the jizya (tax) that gives the unbeliever 
the privilege of not converting yet still ultimately submitting to Islam. Offensive 
jihad can therefore be seen as a principle that HT advocates and openly works 
toward regardless of whether Islam is being attacked as part of the propagation of 
their ideology. HT takes this rhetorical approach and although it may not be 
practical to openly engage in violent activity as an organization or at all, it by no 
means prevents them from immersing recruits into this type of Islamist ideology.  
 Ed Husein, co-founder of the Quilliam Foundation (i.e., self-described as 
the world’s first counter-extremist think-tank, hereafter referred to as Quilliam) 
and a member of HT for three years said HT focuses on recruiting students, in 
particular Arab students, “for the purpose of carrying out military coups. Efforts 
were made to recruit them, and then send them back to their home countries to 
22 
carry out coups d'etat” (Al Shafey, 2010). Husein’s account parallels with the 
rhetoric of HT and their method of offensive jihad.   
 If the discourse is presented in such a compelling and authoritative manner 
and the ideology convinces individuals that such activity is necessarily wrapped 
up in Muslim identity it is not a huge leap to move from Islamism into violent 
Islamism. HT has called on Muslims to ask if their loyalties lie with the country 
they currently reside in or with Islam. An HT promotional video says “I think 
Muslims in this country need to take a long, hard look at themselves and decide 
what is their identity. Are they British or are they Muslim? I am a Muslim. Where 
I live, is irrelevant” (BBC News, 2003). BBC’s Newsnight spoke to many 
Muslims who expressed concern with HT but were afraid to criticize other 
Muslims publicly. However according to the BBC, one influential Muslim 
expressed concerns on camera and said 
I believe that if Hizb Ut Tahrir are not stopped at this stage, and we 
continue to let them politicise and pollute the youngsters minds 
and other gullible people minds, then what will happen in effect is 
that these terrorism acts and these suicide bombings that we hear 
going on around in foreign countries, we will actually start seeing 
these incidents happening outside our doorsteps. (BBC News, 
2003) 
 With religion as the primary identity marker, HT makes it harder for 
Muslims to separate church and state and compel Muslims to have to choose – 
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either religious identity or nationality, for on HT’s view these are mutually 
contradictory.  
 Regardless of HTs’ participation in violent acts, I argue that non-violent 
Islamism, even if only pro forma, provides the intellectual and ideological 
framework that allows for an easy transition into violent Islamism. It is not Islam 
itself but Islamism that allows for an easy transition into violent Islamism. For 
example, Omar Bakri, the founder of Al-Muhajjirun, a violent Islamist 
organization that publicly advocates the use of violence was a former member of 
HT Britain, of which Richard Reid, the British “shoe bomber” belonged to 
(Doward & Wander, 2007). HT has also openly acknowledged its ties with 
terrorist entities as in 2005 when an HT spokesman said senior HT leaders met 
with the Ayatollah Khomeini after the Iranian Revolution to discuss Islamization 
along with seeing Mullah Omar to determine whether he had declared a caliphate 
as the goal of the Taliban. HT said “We have given all these movements 
assistance in following the road back to Khilafat [Caliphate]” (Carpenter, 
Jacobson, & Levitt, 2009). This and the information below provided by Michael 
Whine, along with their espousal of violence (even if they do not personally 
commit violent acts), can be seen as a conveyor belt organization or supporting 
role to move members to participate in and produce violent acts. 
 Michael Whine provides a partial list of terrorists who were members of HT 
or were influenced by its teachings, which number in the 100s (Whine, 2006). 
Whine also provides a quote from HT’s Arabic online journal Al-Waie in an 
article titled “Martydom Operations” which says the texts that permit the killing 
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of unbelievers do not impose restrictions on how to actually kill unbelievers. 
Whine quotes HT as saying 
According to these texts, all ways and means which a Muslim uses 
to kill unbelievers is permitted as long as the enemy unbeliever is 
killed—whether they are killed by weapons from afar or if their 
ranks are penetrated; whether their stronghold is captured and 
penetrated before their eyes, or whether you blow up their planes 
or shoot them down; or whether you blow yourself up among their 
military encampments or blow yourself and them up with a belt of 
explosives. All of these are permissible means of fighting 
unbelievers (Whine, 2006). 
While this is in marked distinction to HT’s other claims to utilize only non-violent 
means to establish the caliphate, it is easy to see how the rhetoric reported later 
(on page 100) could convey a recruit from non-violence into violence or allow for 
the conditions for the recruit to find an organization that does espouse violence. 
One could argue since HT is such a large organization it is therefore comprised of 
individuals with differing views and could include those who do not support 
violence. However, to have such conflicting, mutually contradictory public views 
is unusual for any organization, especially as it relates to violence. Nonetheless 
contradiction is a common enough occurrence, suggesting that relations are 
complex and that one position does not necessarily negate or override the other – 
especially if the existence of both is accepted and not amended. As such, it can be 
assumed that the violent response is an accepted organizational position given its 
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continued representation on the HT website. 
 At the very least, HT has close ties to terrorist organizations (Whine, 
2006) and Iran (Carpenter, Jacobson, & Levitt, 2009) who has made no small 
noise in its desire to wipe Israel off the map. Quilliam also makes the claim on the 
transition from what they refer to as conveyor belt groups like HT into 
radicalization saying “These groups do not condone violence per se, but they do 
contribute to the radicalization process…Through these groups as the State 
Department describes, individuals can turn ‘by stages, into sympathizers, 
supporters, and ultimately, members of terrorist networks” (Carpenter et al., 2009 
p.4). Quilliam argues although these groups may not participate in terrorist 
activities, they lay the foundation for violence through the intellectual framework 
that allows for such activity, hence the term conveyor belt: They convey or pass 
on recruits from ideology into violent activity.  
Of course this is not to claim all recruits will become violent Islamists.  
Neither Quilliam’s nor I take reductionist positions that suggest every person, or 
even most people, indoctrinated into HT ideology will commit violent acts, but 
they do provide the potential for such activity. Islamist ideology is necessary but 
not sufficient for violent Islamism. Without the ideology, there would be no 
Islamist related violence.  
 Kuwaiti liberal Arab author Khalil ‘Ali Haydar sees no distinction 
between violent and non-violent Islamist groups because they both share the same 
enemy and the only difference between the two is the means to arrive at the 
desired end, namely, a global caliphate. He says 
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Notwithstanding the differences in means… and in the 
forms of [these] organizations and movements, most of the 
ultimate strategic goals are similar and are agreed upon, by 
[both] the extremist terrorist groups and the other groups 
and political Islam parties. (The Middle East Media 
Research Institute, 2007b)  
 Of course, the emergence of HT and Islamism did not come out of a 
vacuum. There is historical precedent. I will discuss a brief history of Islam and 
discuss the origins of Islamism but first the uncreated nature of the Quran and the 
doctrine of Abrogation need to be addressed as these are integral to understanding 
the increased likelihood of unquestioning acceptance of doctrine that can 
exacerbate the possibility of the ‘conveyor belt’ process. By not questioning either 
doctrine, this can lead to a dependence upon authorities and unwillingness to 
think for ones self to arrive at the correct interpretation and thus behavior. 
Uncreated nature of the Quran 
A discussion of the uncreated nature of the Quran and the doctrine of 
abrogation are critical to the discussion as they both have very real implications in 
the modern era for Muslims and the interpretation of the holy texts and impacts 
my entire argument. 
 An issue of major importance to Islam that was disputed vociferously in 
early Islam between the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites that continues in the modern 
era with very real life implications is whether the Quran was created or uncreated 
and therefore co-existent and co-eternal with Allah. Islamists argue the Quran is 
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uncreated and therefore society, regardless of time, people or place must conform 
to the Quran and not its converse. Given the influence Islamists have upon the 
“Muslim street” and certain Islamic/Arab governments, Islamists have a very real 
impact upon shaping public policy. 
 In the ninth century until the present time, scholars struggled with a 
controversy on whether the Quran had been created. The Mu’tazilites believed the 
Quran had been created, whereas the Hanbalis, led by Ahmad ibn Hanbal believed 
in the uncreated nature of the Quran. Imam Hanbal at the time was recognized as 
the leading authority for orthodoxy. His school became the only juristic school 
that represented the other three jusristic schools - the Malikis, Shafi’is and the 
Hanifas that later became dominated by the Ash’arites (Saalih ibn ‘Abdil-Azeez 
Aal ash-Shaykh, 2005). The Hanbali doctrine of the uncreated nature of the Quran 
became the orthodox belief and remains so among Sunni Muslims (the majority of 
Muslims) even until today. 
 According to Ruthven, this doctrine remains important to Muslims in the 
same way that Christians hold to the nature of Jesus of Nazareth’s divinity, an 
essential doctrine for Christians both Catholic and Protestant (Ruthven, 2006).  If 
correct, this means it is essential and non-negotiable to a Muslim’s faith. As such, 
the Hanbalis approach the holy text with a literalistic interpretation versus an 
allegorical or particularized approach for certain people and times in certain 
places. This matters for many reasons, but primarily for modern interpretations of 
the holy text since this would naturally lead to the same conclusion that HT has, 
namely, that society must conform to the literalistic interpretation of the Quran 
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and not vice versa. For if the Quran is uncreated and therefore eternal, it matters 
not what time period the Quran happens to appear in, but must be followed 
regardless of peoples, places or time period. 
 In contrast, the Mu’tazilites believed the Quran was created in time and 
therefore could be interpreted with considerable allowances for time grounded 
changes due to historical and social conditions. Thus, the Quran could be 
interpreted in light of modern conditions and Modernity does not need to conform 
itself to allow for an interpretation of the Quran as understood by those closest to 
and in the earliest generations to Muhammad. Although as we shall see later, the 
Mu’tazilites lost the political struggle along with their less literal approach to the 
Quran, although the doctrine of abrogation survived albeit in a more restricted 
form (Ruthven, 2006). The doctrine of abrogation was both an Ash’arite and 
Mu’tazilite position. What matters for our purposes now is who gets to determine 
which verses are abrogated and which are not. 
 HT in their English website and book titled “The Concepts of Hizb ut-
Tahrir” argue for the timelessness of the Quran’s interpretation regardless of the 
time period and that society must conform to the Quran, not its converse. They 
say  
Islamic texts started to be interpreted in a farfetched 
manner so as to conform with the existing societal reality. 
In fact, society ought to have been changed to conform 
with Islam, and not attempt to interpret Islam so as to make 
it compatible with society, because the point at issue is the 
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presence of a corrupt society that needs reforming with an 
ideology; hence, the ideology must be implemented as it is 
and society as a whole must be radically changed on the 
basis of this ideology. In other words, those who attempted 
reform should have implemented the rules of Islam as they 
were, irrespective of the society, the era, the time and the 
place. (see The Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
2008a).  
 Islamists criticize those who would allow the holy texts to be interpreted 
in such a way that they would conform to modern society. Conversely, they say 
society must conform to their understanding of Islam. In their words, this 
ideology as defined by them must be imposed upon society to bring about radical 
change regardless of peoples, places or times.  
 And as we saw much earlier, HT said in their desire to carry Islam to 
Islamic countries first and then the rest of the world “because it is her Message it 
is an eternal and universal Message for all mankind.” (see Hizb ut-Tahrir Party 
Structure; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2008a). HT believes society must bend to their 
interpretation of their holy text and not vice versa regardless of time, place or 
peoples.  
Doctrine of Abrogation 
 The doctrine of abrogation is another component of prime importance to 
our discussion as it has a very real impact upon practical behavior. This doctrine 
states that when there are two mutually contradictory passages found in the 
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Quran, one of the verses will always abrogate [replace] the other verse. These are 
particularly important to reconcile passages from the earlier Meccan period of 
Muhammad with the latter passages of the Medinan period, which Islamists argue 
is usurped by the Meccan verses. Islamists prefer to hold onto the Medinan 
verses. Therefore, whoever gets to define which verses are abrogated and which 
are not controls the discourse, especially if the Quran is viewed as uncreated as 
this means ordinary Muslims have limited means to resist the authorized 
dominant version (unless there is an alternative authoritative approach stating 
differently; hence the importance of an authoritative Reformer version).  
 To deal with issues of apparent mutually contradictory statements, the 
exegetes developed this doctrine known as “abrogation,” which they take from 
Surah 2 verse 106 (2:106) that says “Any verse/message [aya] which We annul or 
consign to oblivion We replace with a better or similar one ….” This doctrine 
came about due to criticisms by non-Muslims who said Muhammad commands 
his companions to do one thing then later commands the opposite. The Persian 
exegete and Mu’tazilite Abu al-Qasim al-Zamakhshari says regarding this 
doctrine: 
To abrogate a verse means that God removes it by putting another 
in its place …. Every verse is made to vanish whenever the well-
being [of the community] requires that it be eliminated - either on 
the basis of the wording or [by] virtue of what is right, or on the 
basis of both these reasons together, either with or without a 
substitute. (Ruthven, 2006, p. 87) 
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 Whoever then controls how the holy texts are interpreted controls the 
behavior of the people. This includes which verses can be abrogated in light of 
other verses and that person or group wields much power within the Islamic 
world. There is always a fear that the ruler will utilize specific verses to maintain 
power over others but not according to the reality of what is, but they can take any 
particular verses to fit their personal or political whims at any given moment. 
Thus a Reformer can say the verses that command the Muslim to kill the infidel 
was given to a specific peoples in space/time history, versus the Islamist who has 
the theological justification to say the verse that states “there is no compulsion in 
religion,” is now abrogated [replaced] by the verses given to Muhammad in the 
period of his life that stress submission to Islam by the use of force. If the Quran 
is uncreated, it naturally follows that it must be interpreted literally for all peoples 
places and times, and because this is considered the orthodox view, Islamists 
claim this is the only approach to the Quran. Further, Islamists say only their 
accepted religious authorities are able to interpret the holy text and abrogate 
whatever scriptures they choose thus leaving open the potential for political 
subjectivity and manipulation. This means dictators can do un-Islamic activities 
and force their citizens to do whatever the accepted religious authorities tell them 
to. For example, if a Muslim leader wants to start a war with a non-Islamic 
society due to the Muslim leaders’ view on the uncreated nature of the Quran 
which means every society must conform to their understanding of Islam, then the 
citizen must submit to that decision. Reformers can still continue delivering their 
message but unless the view of what is orthodox changes, then the Reformers’ 
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message will have little impact, if any. This is a struggle that has occurred for 
centuries as I will demonstrate in the next chapter and unless 
something major changes, the struggle will continue without any fruitful change 
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Chapter 3 
A Brief History of Islam 
Mu’tazilite/Ash’arite struggle (ninth century) 
 I begin the discussion of Reformers throughout history with the 
Mu’tazilite, Ibn Rushd and then later discuss modern Reformers including 
Quilliam and The American Islamic Foundation for Democracy. Space prevents 
the mentioning of the many other Muslim Reformers throughout history to the 
present. I include this list for several reasons and although I would have preferred 
writing an entire paper on Muslim Reformers, I seek to communicate much more 
than simply a historical perspective of Reformers. I begin with the Mu’tazilites 
because their struggle for the primacy of reason vis a vis taqlid [imitation] 
continues to this day as a major issue affecting Islam. Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
played a substantial role within Islam and is recognized as one of the preeminent 
Muslim philosophers. I later discuss modern day Reformers and include Quilliam 
due to their former involvement with HT and their role as the world’s only 
counter extremist think tank. I also include Dr. Zuhdi Jasser and the American 
Islamic Forum for Democracy due to how prolific this organization is in all forms 
of media, primarily in the United States and Canada and the American legislative 
process. 
 I argue the story of Islamism begins close to the introduction of Islam with 
the philosophical struggle between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites in the tenth 
century. I have not seen any other organizations or individuals make this claim as 
of yet, but if we define Islamism as political Islam, then one can make a good case 
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that Islamism began with Muhammad himself, including the use of violence as a 
methodology. The connection of political Islam and the tenth century is the 
deferral to one of the four Sunni Islamic schools of thought, the literalness of the 
Quran due to its uncreated nature and the doctrine of abrogation. This ideology 
allows violent Islamists to have theological cover for arguing the literalness and 
practical applicability today to “behead the unbelievers” (Surah 47 
[Muhammed]:3 and Surah 8 [al-Anfal]:12) as a literal injunction. 
 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) framed the claims of Islamism and 
has had a monumental influence in the Arab and Muslim world. Pakistani 
philosophy professor M. Abdul Hye said Al-Ghazali “made the Ash’arite 
theology so popular that it became practically the theology of the Muslim 
community in general and has continued to remain so up to the present time.” 
(Reilly, 2010, p. 119). 
We also see echoes of Al-Ghazali in the work of the foremost modern 
violent Islamist thinkers, for example, Sayyid Qutb who emphasized action over 
contemplation and like Al-Ghazali denigrates the role of reason while espousing 
anti-rationalism (Reilly, 2010, p. 120). Reilly quoting Rahman says “…The truth 
is that Ash’arism held its sway right up until the twentieth century and holds sway 
even now in the citadels of Islamic conservatism.” (Reilly, 2010, p. 122)  If they 
are correct in this then we have serious issues given what Al-Ghazali had to say 
about reason and Islamism. 
 G.B. MacDonald says in the Encyclopaedia of Islam “Al-Ghazali taught 
that intellect should only be used to destroy trust in itself” (Reilly, 2010, p. 120) 
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thus making this approach anti-intellectual. Further, Reilly mentions a fatwa Al-
Ghazali issued in which he described philosophy as: 
 “the foundation of folly, the cause of all confusion, all 
 errors and all heresy. The person who occupies himself 
 with it becomes colourblind to the beauties of religious law, 
 supported by brilliant proofs…As far as logic is concerned, 
 it is a means of access to philosophy. Now the means of 
 access to something bad is also bad. All those who give 
 evidence of pursuing the teachings of philosophy must 
 be confronted with the following alternatives: either 
 execution by the sword, or conversion to Islam, so that 
 the land may be protected and the traces of those people 
 and their sciences may be eradicated.” (Reilly, 2010, p. 
 123) (bold added for emphasis).  
 According to Al-Ghazali, philosophy is the foundation of all folly, the 
cause of all confusion, errors and heresy. He provides his proscription for any 
would be philosophers and that is either death or conversion to Islam. If Al-
Ghazali were held to the margins of society and had no greater impact than that 
beyond his own particular community in his particular era, I would not even 
mention his name. However, it is because of his substantial impact that I raise his 
ideas here now. As Islamists have adopted Al-Ghazali’s Islamist approach as 
orthodoxy, his discourse has dominated Muslim society and continues to 
permeate Islamic society even today. Al-Ghazali assumes philosophy is in 
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principle anti-Islamic and positions reason against revealed truth. However, there 
have been and continue to be Muslim philosophers who disagree vehemently with 
this claim.  
 Since Al-Ghazali popularized Ash’arite theology in such a manner that it 
continues to dominate the theology of Muslim society today, it is important to 
note what this theology consists of, as Ash’arite theology impacts Islamic 
theology today in no small manner. Ruthven says Abu al-Hasan al-Ash’ari (873-
935), was “philosophically anti-philosophical, rather in the manner that Shafi’i’s 
jurisprudence was rationalistically anti-rational. Whereas the Mu’tazilis and their 
successors fought for the primacy of reason, in the belief that a God who was 
good could not be other than rational.” (Ruthven, 2006, p. 195).  
 Contrast this worldview with that of the Mu’tazilites and the modern neo-
Mu’tazilites who believe in the created nature of the Quran and the essential role 
of reason in approaching the holy texts. Although the Mu’tazilites lost the 
political battle and prominence in the 10th century, of the more notable Muslim 
philosophers are Averroes, Al-Farabi, Al-Kindi and Avicenna and their impact 
lasted through roughly the 12th centuries in spite of a political defeat but not much 
longer than that in the Islamic world (Craig, 2000, p. 3). When Al-Ghazali wrote 
“The Incoherence of the Philosophers,” Averroes responded by writing “The 
Incoherence of the Incoherence.”  Averroes lost his political battle and in 
Cordoba, Spain, in 1195, the Islamists burned 108 of his books and banned the 
teaching of philosophy. He was never to have an ideological impact upon Muslim 
society again (Reilly, 2010, p. 121). Without the freedom to question, Muslims 
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society was left with deferring to the holy texts as interpreted by their respective 
Muslim jurists.   
 On the history of the Mu’tazilites, Craig says “This school of Islamic 
theology came into being through controversies involving the interpretation 
(ta’wil) of the Quran in its anthropomorphic descriptions of God and denial of 
free will. The Mu-tazilites denied literal interpretation of these Quranic passages 
and affirmed man’s free will, whereas the orthodox traditionalists adhered to 
literalism and determinism.” (Craig, 2000, p. 4). We still see this struggle today in 
the modern era with the traditionalist affirming a literal interpretation of the 
Quran with Reformers denying a literalist interpretation of the holy texts thus 
embracing man’s free will and denying fatalism. Craig (2000) says the 
Mu’tazilites were well positioned not only to know their faith was true but to 
know how it was true and defend it thusly with the use of reason (bold added for 
emphasis).  They therefore rendered their beliefs intellectually respectable instead 
of deferring to the anti-intellectual Al-Ghazali position of a repudiation of 
philosophy and conversion or death. Thus Islam is not in principle anti-
intellectual, and Muslims can approach their holy texts to allow for compatibility 
with modernity.   
 Craig goes on saying after Islam conquered much of the known world 
including the Byzantine and Persian empires which both were centers of Hellenic 
learning they were confronted by Christian apologetics suffused with Greek 
philosophical concepts. As such, the Ummah [Muslim community] were forced to 
deal with this new philosophical worldview and had to struggle with the role of 
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reason and if it was a tool they could utilize. They had to answer questions such 
as how much of the world could they understand through reason and could they 
use it to understand their revelation? It was at this time the Caliph al-Mamoun 
sponsored the first Arabic philosopher al-Kindi of the first fully developed 
Muslim theological school, that of the Mu’tazilites. (Estrin, 2010).    
 For a brief insight into Islamic philosopher al-Kindi’s (805-873AD) 
thought is one of his more notable sayings -  
 "We ought not to be embarrassed of appreciating the truth 
 and of obtaining it wherever it comes from, even if it comes 
 from races distant and nations different from us. Nothing 
 should be dearer to the seeker of truth than the truth itself, 
 and there is no deterioration of the truth, nor belittling 
 either of one who speaks it or conveys it."   
Modern day Reformers seem to take the same approach as al-Kindi, 
namely, that if something is true, it matters not the source from where it originates 
from. It could come from the Quran or even from the West. One would be hard 
pressed to find even one Islamist who holds a similar viewpoint. One is reminded 
of Aristotle who also said “it is the mark of an educated man to entertain an idea 
without accepting it” along with the French philosopher and scientist Blaise 
Pascal who said “those who do not love the truth disregard it on the grounds that 
it is disputed.”  I mention this because al-Kindi’s approach toward truth is very 
similar to that of both Aristotle and Pascal. This illustrates that it was not merely 
the West that was thinking such thoughts about ontology, metaphysics and 
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epistemology but there were indeed Muslim philosophers who approached truth in 
a similar fashion and, as such, there is nothing within some understandings of 
Islam that prevents such an approach. 
Islamist Ideology 
 Islamist ideology originated in literalistic, non-allegorical hermeneutical 
understandings of the holy texts as understood and propagated by those closest to 
Muhammad in both time and relationship. This approach was continued for 
centuries by Islamic jurists and continues through to today.  
 Najjar (2004, p.207) notes 
in an attempt to save the ‘obvious sense’ of the religious text 
against the practice of reason, the Ash’arites, which enjoyed 
hegemony in the east under al-Ghazali asserted the use of reason is 
solely for legal purposes and further denied free will arguing, as 
Allah is the cause of everything, including good and evil, they 
therefore denied the law of nature and the harmony of philosophy 
and science. From this view there are no natural laws for it is Allah 
directly doing these things at every given moment, since Allah is 
pure will and is not constrained by reason or anything else. 
Accordingly, reasoning, as a human effort, generates no 
knowledge; it is simply an occasion after which knowledge is 
created by God. God is the only Creator, He creates in the human 
being power and choice.   
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The Islamists could then order any actions, irrational or not, and claim it was 
Allah’s will. And no one could gainsay the Islamists, because they would in effect 
be gainsaying Allah, for the Islamist controls the public discourse and claims to 
receive their directives directly from Allah. Taking away individual reasoning 
from the outset ensures hegemony over interpretation, public discourse and 
actions. 
 Michael Marmura says the Ash’arites denied causality to retain the idea of 
Allah’s omnipotence as understood by their conception of the Quran. He says 
Ash’ari “adopted the occasionalist doctrine that causal efficacy resides 
exclusively with the divine will” (Marmura, 1973 p.286). Thus, what appears as 
uniformity found in the laws of nature is merely Allah constantly creating and 
keeping together the components of physical substances and seeming causal 
relations. So, what appears to be uniform laws that govern the natural world 
Islamists believe is merely Allah constantly creating and keeping together all of 
reality. On this view, Allah by his will is the cosmic glue that keeps the universe 
running smoothly. Muslim philosophers opposed this view and instead embraced 
Aristotelian metaphysics, which includes causality. The Ash’arites (8th to 10th 
centuries) called this shirq [heresy] for these Muslim philosophers are giving an 
attribute to humanity that is reserved only for Allah, namely, agency (will). Dr. 
Craig says, 
In opting for a metaphysics of atoms and accidents which are 
continually being re-created by God, the Islamic theologians 
necessarily had to reject Aristotle’s actuality/potency distinction 
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and its attendant analysis of causality…Thus the metaphysics of 
atoms and accidents inevitably led the Islamic theologians to deny 
the presence of any secondary causality in the world. (Craig, 2000, 
p. 5) 
This Islamist view is known as Occasionalism, where Allah is the only 
cause of any and all action in the world without any secondary causality. They 
believe Allah directly mediates all interaction between mind and body. The 
appearance of direct interaction between mind and body is maintained by Allah, 
including the appearance of cause and effect where the actor intends to perform 
an action and does so, his mind does not act on his body directly but is mediated 
by Allah (Occasionalism, 2010). 
So, what looks like cause and effect to the human mind is merely Allah 
creating and keeping together what he wills. This belief resulted practically in a 
denial of man’s free will, something all religions have and continue to struggle 
with. The age-old epistemological question of “how do you know you’re not a 
mind in a vat being stimulated by a mad scientist?” has turned the scientist into 
Allah where every human action is directed by Allah as mankind is stimulated by 
Allah to do his will and cannot not do the will of Allah (which certain sects of 
Christian also affirm, in particular five point Calvinism).  
Ruthven (2006) claims the Quran reaffirms the notion of creation as a 
continuous process rather than a single act initiated by the Creator freeing itself 
from the creation at the beginning of the Bible. He argues the idea of Allah 
constantly creating is at the core of Quranic doctrine. As a result, he says “Reality 
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can never be grasped empirically, but must forever recede toward a horizon of 
inexhaustible appearances” (Ruthven, 2006, p. 103). This leads directly to 
fatalism where every single event in life is caused by Allah and no Muslim can 
ever be found guilty of transgressing any law or regulation for they are merely 
doing Allah’s will whatever that may be at any given moment. The key for 
Muslims is then finding the way to follow Allah’s will or plan.  Such an ideology 
is potentially very flammable when one couples an arbitrary will of a deity with 
verses that command Muslims to kill infidels along with Muslim jurists who take 
these passages literally. This is exactly how bad interpretation can lead to bad 
behavior.  
 In quoting Fakhry, Dr. Craig says the metaphysical system of Al-Ghazali 
was “just as responsible as the doctrine of the Quran for the fatalism that 
characterises the religion of Islam” and Dr. Craig notes the Mu’tazilites were 
uncomfortable with the determinism that necessarily followed the denial of 
secondary causality (Craig, 2000, p. 6).  Al-Ghazali valued the will of Allah over 
all of his other virtues, which included reason. Thus, the supremacy of Allah’s 
will became the orthodox view where everything that happens, happens 
necessarily due to the will of Allah. This necessarily includes military defeats and 
humiliations. On the Islamist worldview, however, this merely fortifies within 
them a doubling up of religious fervor for defeat can only mean that they were not 
committed enough and Allah taught them a lesson to motivate even more 
fervency in their religiosity and actions (Susser 2002).  
  The Mu’tazilites dominated Islamic theology for sixteen years from 833-
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848; however, in 848 Caliph al-Mutawakkil repudiated Mu-tazilism and gave 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (founder of one of the four Islamic schools - Hanbali) the 
freedom to repress the Mu’tazilites in an attempt to restore conservative 
orthodoxy in the early to mid ninth century (Craig, 2000, p. 6).  This loss of 
political power led to the undermining and devaluing of their version as the 
dominant discourse. Their view of free will, causality, and the use of one’s reason 
was no longer seen as orthodox, whereas the Ash’arite view came to dominate as 
the orthodox view. 
Short-lived modern reforms 
 From the tenth century onward, the Islamist view was the dominant public 
discourse and has remained until today with a few short lived exceptions 
including modern day Turkey (although this may be fading) and Egypt recently 
enjoyed reforms both philosophical and practical from the mid-nineteenth century 
into the mid-twentieth century beginning with the Albanian Muhammad Ali 
through his grandson Khedive Ismail who ruled Egypt. Ali and Ismail brought 
about education reforms, adopted Western laws and had a free press; however, the 
crushing defeat of then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s secular Pan-
Arabism in 1967 (see page 11) led to what an Egyptian professor called an 
increasing theocratization of the Arab world (Najjar, 2004, p. 196).  The 
Reformist movement has yet to recover on any notable scale being left to 
intellectual circles but not among ordinary Muslims. Najjar (2004, p.212) argues 
the impact of the reformist movement is negligible, as their ideas are inaccessible 
and above the reach of ordinary citizens: 
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Most Egyptians, as well as most Arabs and Muslims, are 
either illiterate or too poor and too busy with the problems 
of daily living to be more than oblivious and indifferent to 
intellectual endeavours. Most of them depend on their 
religious leaders and-mosque preachers for guidance; the 
intellectual elite are too remote, and too arrogant, to have 
any appeal for them. Economic, social and educational 
disparities have created a chasm between classes, sharp 
enough to preclude any meaningful communication, not to 
say dialogue.  
 If Reformers are going to make inroads into the public discourse within 
Muslim society, they will have to find ways to reach the “Muslim street.”  This 
data is confirmed by the United Nations 2009 Arab Human Development Report, 
which shows adult illiteracy between 20-40% in certain Arab/Muslim countries 
(United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 
2009). Eight years ago there were 65 million illiterate Arab adults. This new 
report indicates that rate has gotten worse and gone up. This means Reformers 
will have to work with imams to ensure those who have no access to written texts 
can receive a public discourse that is not a literalist understanding only but that 
there are other options available to them that are orthodox. Additionally, poverty 
is a rampant problem and has only gotten worse since the last report. This leaves 
ordinary Muslims dependent upon their local imams for providing access and 
interpretation to the holy texts. Of course, this does not include all ordinary 
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Muslims but even in a highly literate Muslim/Arab society, if poverty is a rampant 
problem, then this leaves little time for contemplation of philosophy and the back 
and forth struggle between Islamists and Reformers when it is more convenient to 
simply attend the mosque as a faithful Muslim go home to ones responsibilities. 
This leaves little time for ordinary Muslims to engage in issues such as the 
ontology of the Quran, causality, Occasionalism and other issues of fierce debate 
that have occurred since the ninth century.  
 Muslim theologian and philosopher Ibn Hazm (994 - 1064 A.D.) adhered 
to the Zahiri school of jurisprudence, which emphasized the literalness of the 
Quran and stepped away from reasoning by analogy and the Quran as metaphor. 
He said that Allah’s power is such that he may decide to punish the obedient and 
to reward the disobedient and no one can gainsay him. Allah is unaccountable and 
there is no standard of judgment to him because all he does is just (Makdisi, 1979, 
p. 4). We see this exact discussion in Plato’s Euthyphro where Socrates asks if the 
gods approve an act because it is just or is it just because the gods approve it. 
Those who emphasize the will of Allah would side with the former, namely, that a 
thing is just because Allah wills it.1 Allah could just as easily order an individual 
to run over an old lady with one’s car as to help her across the street. And no one 
can question this directive. The problem with this view is the arbitrariness of 
Allah’s actions, at least as commanded by those in authority. So, if those in 
authority decide to pursue what would seem to be a clearly unjust act would have 
                                                
1 Christian theologians have gotten around this dilemma by arguing God commands 
something that is good as the command stems from his nature.  For example, it is wrong 
to lie because God is truth.  It is wrong to steal because God is just etc. This takes away 
the arbitrary nature of Occasionalism. 
46 
no argument against it because Allah wills it. The jurist interpreting the holy text 
gets to say whether Allah wills it and therefore it becomes an issue of 
hermeneutics. It has the potential to become a world like that described by Syrian 
philosopher Sadik Jalal Al’Azm in an interview with Qatar’s Al-Raya Daily (The 
Middle East Media Research Institute 2008) who said 
In my estimation this [scientific knowledge] has grown even worse 
today. There is greater ignorance. There are opinions, especially in 
fundamentalist Islam, that completely reject modern science, the 
West, and all that it produces. If you take their thinking to its 
logical conclusion, they will become [like] the Taliban on this 
issue. 
Although there are certain Christian fundamentalist sects (e.g., David Koresh of 
the Branch Davidian Compound, the Westboro Baptist Church) that had/have 
respectively extremely charismatic leaders who claim to speak for the will of God 
which only they can provide for their followers, the difference is these groups are 
by no means mainstream and have limited impact except to their small group of 
followers. The prevalence of Islamist discourse with such an ideology has 
increased exponentially since 1967 in the modern era and without a counter-
narrative to oppose this worldview, they will continue to have a monopoly on the 
discourse. 
 Hassan Butt, who was a member of what he terms the British Jihadi 
Network scoffs at the idea of Western foreign policy as the key motivator for his 
actions and those of his fellow violent Islamists who were committed to violence. 
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By those who blamed the foreign policy of the U.K. government for their actions, 
Butt says they did their propaganda work for them and “they also helped to draw 
away any critical examination from the real engine of our violence: Islamic 
theology” (Butt, 2007 p.1). What truly motivated Butt and what he terms as 
“British extremists” was not the deaths of fellow Muslims around the world but “a 
sense that we were fighting for the creation of a revolutionary worldwide Islamic 
state that would dispense Islamic justice” (Butt, 2007 p.2). Butt argues the Violent 
Islamist argument is as follows: 
First Premise: There is either Dar ul-Islam (The Land of Islam) or 
Dar ul-Kufr (the Land of Unbelief) 
Second Premise: There is no pure Dar ul-Islam (The Land of 
Islam) 
Third Premise: Islam requires Muslims to wage war against 
unbelief 
Conclusion: Therefore, the entire world is reclassified as Dar ul-
Hulb (a Land of War) and any means are accepted to 
achieve the pure Dar ul-Islam. (Butt, 2007 p.2)  
 Butt argues it is the responsibility of Muslims to engage with the passages 
in the Quran that instruct on killing unbelievers, to challenge centuries old 
theological debates, admit the extremism in their communities and Muslim 
scholars must 
come forward with a refashioned set of rules and a revised 
understanding of the rights and responsibilities of Muslims whose 
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homes and souls are firmly planted in what I’d like to term the 
Land of Co-existence…and perhaps we will discover that the 
concept of killing in the name of Islam is no more than an 
anachronism. (Butt, 2007 p.3) 
Indeed, this must occur within Islam, beginning with religious institutions. 
Muslim scholars created the jurisprudence that allows for violent Islamism and it 
remains Muslim scholars who carry the most authority within Islam, even above 
that of the caliph since not even the caliph can create law but must merely depend 
upon Muslim scholars to provide the correct jurisprudence. Therefore, a re-
visiting of the Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to allow for interaction between Dar 
ul-Islam (The Land of Islam) and Dar ul-Kufr (the Land of Unbelief) is critical 
and must be presented in the form of an authoritative, comprehensive and 
compelling counter-narrative to the current discourse of violent Islamism.  
 Butt does not speak for all Muslims, yet there are others who criticize 
Islamism. One female critic, who goes by the pseudonym Umm Mustafa (2008 
p.2) for fear of reprisal, states: 
I realised that Hizb ut-Tahrir has devised a set of political ideas 
and goals which are in fact separate from Islam. Its tactic of 
convincing young people that its political goals are synonymous 
with Islam is its most dangerous and deceptive trick. In reality, its 
aims come from one man's socialist ideals, mixed with his own 
interpretation of Islamic scripture.  
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 Even more encouraging is that Noman Benotman, a former leader of the 
Islamist Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, wrote an open letter to Osama bin Laden 
asking him to give up armed jihad citing his actions as “un-Islamic” and harmful 
to Muslims worldwide. He says, “Most Muslim communities wish to embrace and 
engage in democracy; they seek justice, peace, freedom, human rights and 
peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world. Instead, where there was 
harmony, you brought discord” (Benotman - 2010 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/10/an_open_letter_to_osama_bin_la
den). 
He urges Osama bin Laden to make sure the jihad of al Qaeda “reverts back 
to the path of ahl al sunnawal jama’a (the people who follow the example of 
Muhammad and the majority) and realigns its acts and policies with authentic 
Islamic rulings” (Benotman, 2010 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/10/an_open_letter_to_osama_bin_la
den). Note, that Benotman is appealing to Islamic sources for authority. He 
merely disagrees with the interpretation bin Laden has utilized to arrive at his 
violent actions.  
Muslim Brotherhood  
 Islamism is not resigned to the eras of Islamic history but 
continues and, I argue, is gaining more influence. In recent modern history, 
Islamist ideology has been propagated through the Muslim Brotherhood, which is 
why I include a discussion on this organization here. Al Jazeera English reports 
that they are considered the world’s most influential Islamist movement with an 
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estimated 300,000 dedicated members, a massive bureaucracy and a very 
conservative constituency 
(http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/2010/11/2010111681527837704.html)  
 It was in the conditions of poverty and a lack of education opportunities 
that Hasan al-Banna, founded the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, the Muslim Brotherhood 
in 1928 in Cairo. al-Banna believed the key to reform was to resist Western 
secular ideas and to conversely promote political Islam. The Ikhwan adopted the 
motto - “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our 
constitution. Jihad is our way. Martyrdom is our highest hope” (G. Hussain, 2010, 
p. 2). The conditions were such that ordinary Muslims were susceptible to such an 
ideology coupled with a lack of time and inclination to search out the answers on 
their own. This motto remains the Brotherhood’s motto. 
 al-Banna focused for the next two decades on building relationships with 
mosques, welfare associations and neighborhood groups. “By joining local cells, 
members could access a well-established and well-resourced community of 
activists who would help them in all aspects of their lives. The foundations of 
what we now know as Islamism were being laid” (G. Hussain, 2010, p. 4). Thus, 
in that party, al-Banna was able to spread his ideas through the help he provided 
to his community and their dependence upon the social services the 
Brotherhood’s infrastructure provided. This approach has proven to be very 
successful in gaining inroads within Islamic communities and is the same 
approach Hezbollah has taken in Lebanon to fill the void by the Lebanese 
government – socially, economically and even militarily. The troublesome aspect 
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of this approach is it is difficult to accept help from either organization without 
also supporting their cause, which in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas includes 
violent Islamism, and with the Brotherhood, Islamist ideology. 
 Muslim Reformer Dr. Ahmad Al-Ruba’i says in an Al-Arabiyah interview 
the beginning of all religious terrorism originated with the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
ideology of takfir [apostasy] where Muslims accuse other Muslims of apostasy 
(Al-Ruba’i, 2008 http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3076.htm). Al-
Ruba’i lays the blame for this ideology at the feet of Islamist Sayyid Qutb. He 
says  
Sayyid Qutb’s book Milestones was the inspiration and the guide 
for all of the takfir [apostate] movements that came afterwards. 
The founders of the violent groups were raised on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and those who worked with bin Laden and Al-Qa’ida 
went out under the mantle of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Al-Ruba’i, 
2008, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3076.htm) 
In it, Qutb divides the world into two halves - the world of unbelief and the world 
of Islam. Qutb argues if Islam is to once again lead the world then the Muslim 
community must be restored to its original form. There is still a desire to this day 
to return to the pure form of Islam; however, it is unclear what exactly this looks 
like practically in reality; however, men like Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb 
nonetheless make cases for such a reality along with that of their followers and 
those who remain influenced by it to this day.   
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 Islam did have a brief time of an appreciation of the role of reason within 
Islam as a system of thought in the public discourse. Of course there are many 
Muslim thinkers and Reformers who have started philosophical societies who 
engage with not only the arguments of the day but science as noted earlier. This is 
not to say there is no reason in Islam as a system nor for any particular Muslim. 
However, with the triumph of Ash’ari and the consequent deferral to Islam as 
understood by those closest to Muhammad along with a refusal to use 
independent reasoning to arrive at legal opinions nor to value the role of 
philosophy and reason, has led to a dependence upon the respective authorities for 
daily living and taqlid [imitation]. As we have seen, if the respected authority 
provides the intellectual framework of violent Islamism, this does in fact lead to 
destructive behavior.  
 Fuller (2003) argues that throughout much of Islamic history, Muslim 
scholars were either the primary or only interpreter of Islamic texts and Islamic 
jurisprudence; however, moving forward into modern history, the twentieth 
century saw the rise of Islamic intellectuals not trained as clerics but earned 
degrees from Western universities. These modern Muslim intellectuals also relied 
upon their own reading of the holy texts. “Their knowledge of Islam is based on 
their own readings and study of the Quran and the Hadith - reminiscent of the 
Protestant Reformation when Christians were encouraged – indeed, required – to 
go back to the texts and understand them for themselves” (Fuller, 2003, p. 58).  
From a Reformers perspective, this is very encouraging indeed. The Protestant 
Reformation certainly had its fair share of wars and killing in the name of 
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Christianity including a schism in the church; however, the for the majority of 
people and nations currently practices allow for a freedom to worship as one so 
desires within Christianity. One can only hope for the same within Islam.
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Chapter 4 
Modern Middle East History 
Susser (2003) highlights recent history as a major reason why much of 
Islam’s perception of the West is not friendly (2003, P.3). Fast forward from the 
tenth century to the seventeenth century to the Battle of Vienna in 1683, which 
marked the beginning of the end of the last Islamic caliphate. This defeat and 
continuous defeats of the caliphate lasted until World War I, from which the 
modern borders were drawn, mostly by the French and English, and the collapse 
of the Ottoman empire in 1923 (Cleveland, P.183). 
 From this defeat of the Turks in the battle of Vienna in 1683 and on, the 
Muslim world experienced recessive, repetitive defeat, including: Napoleon’s 
invasion of Egypt, the British conquest of Egypt in 1882, defeat at the hands of 
the newly formed modern Jewish state in 1948, to continued defeats in1956, 
1967,2 1973, 1982 by Israel, and the defeat of the largest standing Arab army in 
1991 in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq by the United States. There have certainly been 
historical defeats of the West by Islamic armies; however, my intent is to focus on 
modern history. 
 The Six Day War in 1967 has a particular importance to my discussion 
given that Islamism has since filled the void of President Nasser’s secular pan-
Arabism. This allowed Islamists to claim the utter inadequacy of secularism, 
modernity and provide Islamism as the sole solution to all of the Muslim/Arab 
                                                
2 At the National Military Museum in Cairo, the museum moves from “the Suez 
Campaign” in 1956 directly into the 1973 war with no mention whatsoever of the Six 
Day War. This defeat was so humiliating for Egypt to where they don’t even recognize a 
war took place. 
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world’s ills. Even the term Six Day War is an Israeli term, a term of the victors. In 
two days, Israel defeated the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Lebanese 
armies. The name itself is humiliating. That defeat was not just a military defeat 
of Egypt, but also a defeat of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second president of 
Egypt’s entire secular political philosophy of Pan-Arabism 
(http://www.meforum.org/518/requiem-for-arab-nationalism/).  The reason why 
Nasser merits such a lengthy discussion viz. 1967 is Egypt was the leading Arab 
power at this time and his Pan-Arabism was expected to re-create a powerful 
Arab world. To illustrate the significance this defeat had not just upon President 
Nasser but the Arab world, Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser said in his 
personal memoir that for those who knew Nasser, 
the events of June 5 [1967] dealt him a fatal blown. They finished 
him off. Those who knew Nasser realized that he did not die on 
September 28, 1970, but on June 5, 1967, exactly one hour after 
the war broke out … that was how he looked at the time, and for a 
long time afterwards – a living corpse. (Sadat, 1981, pp. 179-180).  
Sadat stressed here how critical this war was and the collapse of his political 
philosophy also destroyed the man himself beginning on June 5, 1967. Even more 
importantly, the Six Day War was a turning point in the Middle East for both 
Israel and the entire region.  
 Nasser’s secular nationalism lost its appeal and not just one but five Arab 
armies suffered a monumental defeat of epic proportions by a Westernized 
country in the heart of 22 Arab countries. This was merely another reminder of 
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Arab humiliation. Although the Egyptian media highlighted the fake victories of 
the Egyptian armies over the Israelis, the reality was quite the converse. So, 
although Egyptians cheered in the streets for the victories over Israel, the opposite 
had actually happened. When this became known, Nasser was publicly ridiculed 
by Egyptians, his own people, along with his entire political philosophy (Sadat, 
1981). 
President Nasser’s secular pan-Arabism took such a defeat that it would 
never recover and could only open up a space for a separate ideology to fill that 
void, in this case, Islamism. Confirming this view, Syrian philosopher Sadik 
Al’Azm concurs with Susser’s view on the crushing defeat the Six Day War had 
on pan-Arabism. He says 
[The pan-Arab failure] increased the feelings of humiliation, 
marginalization, and a sense of failure that formed a sudden and 
unexpected vacuum, which was filled by the Islamist movements. 
A number of critics – myself included – grasped this phenomenon 
after the defeat in June 1967. (The Middle East Middle Research 
Institute, 2008 
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2786.htm) 
If there was ever a monumental turning point in the Middle East, this was it given 
that Susser (2002, Summer lecture series) argues this crushing defeat of Nasser’s 
political philosophy gave way to two processes:  
1.   Pragmatization of politics. Instead of Arab unity, 
pragmatically they did what was possible and turned into 
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realists. The state order was legitimized and accepted. State 
interests were protected. The right of Arab states to do as it 
pleases with self-interest against Arab unity of all nations. 
Islamists see themselves Muslim first, citizen second, 
seeing the nation state as a Western creation and through 
various means pursue a global caliphate.  
2.   The emergence of Islamic radicalism, which still refuses 
the West. Islamism filled the ideological vacuum left 
vacant by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Pan Arabism.  
Islamism still fills this void in Middle Eastern countries either through the 
political process or more noticeably through the ideology that controls a dominant 
discourse through the social and public sphere.
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Chapter 5 
Islamic Law 
Islam is a religion of law. Therefore, to better understand Islam, we must 
understand Islamic law and the very real impact it has on Islamic society and their 
interaction with non-Muslims.  
 Bernard Weiss (1978, p. 200) says the sacred texts, which all rules of 
Islamic law are derived from are: the Quran, the Sunna and the Consensus of the 
Muslim community. The Sunna consists of the inspired sayings and acts of 
Muhammad as recorded in the Hadith. The Consensus of the Ummah [Muslim 
Community] is less authoritative but is still a source that law is derived from and 
also subject to ijtihad.  
 If this is true, then it is critical the hadiths that are accepted as reliable are 
accurate reflections to the reality of what is, or what Muhammad actually said and 
did in history. The origins of hadiths attributed to Muhammad himself are to this 
day the subject of dispute which are contained in all six canonical collections. 
Hadith collectors constructed these hadiths, the most well known being 
Muhammad ibn Isma’il al-Bukhari (810-870 A.D.) and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj 
(died in 875 A.D.) who travelled vast distances to find whom he considered to be 
reliable sources who recounted Muhammad’s allegedly true sayings and actions 
(Ruthven, 2006, p. 131). Given the weight the hadiths play in interpretation and 
understanding, it is therefore critical to determine which hadiths are true and 
which are not.  Additionally, the hadiths that made the accepted list of true hadiths 
have a major impact upon Muslim society. 
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 These hadiths were collected more than 200 years after Muhammad lived 
and therefore had to be verified as to its reliability. Historians use various tools to 
verify the accuracy of a text, one of the main factors being eyewitness accounts 
that are early viz. the events they report on. Gary Habermas says that “when 
scholars have ancient sources that are both very early and based on eyewitness 
testimony, they have a combination that is very difficult to dismiss” (Habermas, 
2005, p.3). What holds even more weight among historians is those texts that 
agree with one another and therefore corroborate the testimony of the early, 
eyewitness accounts. And we cannot employ the circular reasoning of the Quran 
and hadiths are true because the Quran and the hadiths say they are true. We must 
utilize an outside verification of the holy texts to ensure their reliability. The same 
holds true for Christianity as well. 
 The reliability of these hadiths are critical as the acceptance of certain 
hadiths over others as true will impact the everyday behavior of Muslims given its 
acceptance as a necessary component of the holy text. For example, if the Hadith 
(Ishaq:324) that “He said, 'Fight them so that there is no more rebellion, and 
religion, all of it, is for Allah only. Allah must have no rivals'" is considered an 
accurate reflection of reality, then there will be some who will act out upon this 
belief. It seems Muslims put much faith in hadiths that were collected and 
constructed hundreds of years after Muhammad’s death and so ensuring their 
accuracy is of prime importance given the prime importance they play in shaping 
the beliefs and actions of Islamic society. 
 Ruthven quotes Hallaq who said 
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law has been so successfully developed in Islam that it would not 
be an exaggeration to characterize Islamic culture as a legal 
culture. But this very blessing of the pre-modern culture turned out 
to be an obstacle in the face of modernization. The system that had 
served Muslims so well in the past now stood in the way of change 
– a change that proved to be so needed in a twentieth-century 
culture vulnerable to an endless variety of western influences and 
pressures. (Ruthven, 2006, p. 135, as cited in Hallaq, 1997, p. 3) 
As I note later under Muslim identity, the Islamist has sought to portray any 
Western influence as anti-Islamic and therefore to be avoided altogether.  
 Horowitz (1994) says within an Islamic system, because the essential 
character of law comes from a divine source as revealed to Muhammad, change is 
merely relegated to how one applies these revealed principles. Therefore, one can 
never create Islamic law, one can only discover it. And once one has discovered 
it, the societal changes that are needed come about merely from applying its 
already revealed truths to modern day issues. If true, this means one can never 
come up with a new interpretation of the Quran, but merely an application given 
the current circumstances. So, for example, if an abrogated verse says the Muslim 
is obligated to kill the infidels wherever they find him, then the question is not 
one of interpretation but of applicability. Unless the verse is abrogated by a verse 
that suggests otherwise, the issue of killing infidels is already settled. Now the 
only question that remains is the best means to apply this interpretation (see 
Appendix A). 
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 Bernard Weiss (1978) argues Islamic tradition affirms with great emphasis 
the Shari’a is not given to man ready-made to be passively received and applied 
but actively constructed on the basis of the sacred texts which are its 
acknowledged sources. This means Muslims must depend upon the interpretation 
by Muslim scholars to help them arrive at the correct interpretation. To further 
complicate matters, whereas Allah has laid down the rules for man’s behavior, it 
is man’s duty to derive them from their sources. In Islamic metaphor, only the 
roots are given; however, it is man’s duty to arrive at the branches or the fruit via 
human husbandry. Although the sacred texts contain the law, the law must be 
extracted from the texts and are therefore considered sources of law but not law 
itself. This means the ordinary Muslim cannot arrive at the law with his own level 
of understanding but must defer to those whom they consider the most orthodox 
source and therefore comes closest to the rules as prescribed by Allah. Otherwise, 
they could be in jeopardy for their salvation. (For fuller discussion see following 
section Hermeneutics within Islam)  
 Within Islam, the respective Muslim states have no legislative authority in 
principle. They derive their authority from the interpretation of Shari’a by way of 
the respected authority of jurists who have discovered what Allah has decreed. 
Not even a caliph [ruler of Islamic super state] could create law. This 
demonstrates the point of how truly important hermeneutics is to Islamic society. 
This means Muslim jurists have much control over society because they control 
the interpretation of the law. This can lead to violent acts as those in authority can 
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use this to justify any types of behavior saying it is the will of Allah. Dr Ahmad 
Al-Ruba’i on Al-Arabiya television said 
the rulers who persecuted the people summoned the clerics and 
said, ‘Go to the mosques and tell the people that man has no free 
will.’ This would justify all the crimes committed by the rulers, 
because they are the will of Allah. And so the story goes on. (Al-
Ruba’i, 2008 -
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3076.htm) 
This does not mean that the rulers will take advantage of their citizens, but it does 
demonstrate that the potential for abuse is there. If there is no accountability, then 
the ruler can do whatever he pleases so long as he gets legal backing from the 
jurists.  
Hermeneutics within Islam 
 Because belief affects behavior, as in any other religion, how the 
Reformer and Islamist interprets the holy text will determine how one applies the 
text. The Reformer says the holy text must be interpreted in light of historical 
events whereas the Islamist says the holy text is applicable for all peoples, places 
and times regardless of variance with modernity. For the Islamist, current society 
must adapt to the holy text, not vice versa.  
 Nor can a Muslim receive the holy text directly from Allah as Mohammad 
did, as Muslims believes the angel Gabriel gave the holy texts to Muhammad 
directly. Given the seemingly conflicting accounts within the Quran, the Muslim 
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is left to either interpreting the holy text for one’s self or depending upon a 
[mujtahid] trained legal scholar to do so.  
 There is precedent within Islam that allows those who consider themselves 
orthodox or true Muslims to interpret the holy texts in such a manner that anyone 
who disagrees with their interpretation is in a state of jahaliya (ignorance) thereby 
demonstrating they are a kufr (unbeliever/infidel). Ruthven says Tirmidhi (824-
892 AD) one of the six universally recognized Sunni canonists preserved a hadith 
of Muhammad that says anyone who interprets the Quran according to his 
personal opinion and not according to ilm (knowledge, the recognized 
methodology) “has proved himself to be a kafir (infidel).” (Ruthven, 2006 p. 109). 
He says further, “at the intellectual level” Muslims would undermine the social 
power of the mujtahids (religious scholars) by providing “unauthorized 
interpretations” of Scripture, as they deviated from the hermeneutical principles 
devised by the mujtahids (Ruthven, 2006, p. 109).   
 Although Rahman (1970) notes that family law is considered fairly 
straight forward and therefore has little need for explanation, but even this aspect 
of holy text is still interpreted at variance by both Islamist and non-Islamists, and 
the ordinary Muslim can never get to the meaning of the text without 
interpretation by whoever they trust to interpret the texts in accordance with 
Allah’s directives. Because the Reformer is more concerned with one’s personal 
relationship with Allah they are not as concerned with regulating behavior; 
however, Islamists are very concerned with who and under what conditions the 
true meaning of the text as defined by them is interpreted.  
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 If true, the question becomes “whose interpretation?” This is critical, 
because whoever gets to interpret the text gains more power and credibility. 
Michel Foucault (2006 - http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/2005q.html) says 
“Knowledge appears to be profoundly linked to a whole series of power effects. 
Archaeology is essentially this detection.” Even though Islamists for the most part 
have little sway on public policy through Muslim/Arab governments, they are 
currently the only option for most Muslims in the Arab world (Fuller, 2003, p. 
24).  No individuals or groups have challenged their authority with much force 
and are seen as more orthodox than Reformers.  
Ijtihad - Independent Reasoning 
 Ijtihad is a crucial term, without which, no Muslim can ever come to a 
jurisprudential conclusion on their own but must be dependent upon the trusted 
Muslim authority to interpret their particular issue given their understanding of 
Islamic law. Ijtihad is the term used to extract Islamic law from its sources and is 
literally defined as “striving” or “exerting.”  In a jurisprudential sense, ijtihad is 
defined as “the capacity for making deductions in matters of law in cases to which 
no express text or rule already determined by Ijma (consensus) is applicable.”  It 
is commonly referred to as “independent reasoning” or “rethinking” (Ali-
Karamali & Dunne, 1994).  I will discuss the several definitions for ijtihad and 
why those distinctions matter, what Muslim scholars argue if Muslims are 
allowed to practice it today, why this is important to this discussion, and how 
looking into this particular issue will help us better understand who has the 
recognized authority within Islam.  
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 Before I discuss the several definitions over the years, to help understand 
ijtihad, its converse is taqlid, which means the acceptance of a rule on the basis of 
authority. The individual submitting to taqlid therefore does not reason for one’s 
self but merely trusts the interpretation of a mujtahid (individuals who are legal 
and religious experts in Islamic law and can practice ijtihad). In practice, someone 
utilizing ijtihad will think through with their own reasoning the rule of law viz. 
the particular issue at hand. Conversely, with taqlid, the Muslim imitates or 
submits to the authority of the mujtahid who is considered an authority. His 
authority stems from his methodology or how valid his derivation of the textual 
source is. This is primarily considered consent of the Ummah [Muslim 
community]. If one submits to the consensus of the Ummah (taqlid), then there is 
no need to interpret and derive rulings from the holy text for one’s self (ijtihad), 
as these have already been decided upon by the earliest generations of Muslims 
closest to Muhammad.  
Wiederhold (1996, p. 243) defines taqlid as the adoption of a legal opinion 
(imitation) without examining its underlying legal merits because they lack the 
capacity to arrive at the most appropriate decision for a particular legal question. 
Therefore, because Islamic law can only be discovered and not created, those in 
authority argue everything necessary for living in society has already been 
defined and one must defer by taqlid to Islam as defined by those who were 
closest to Muhammad no matter the new advances in society and concepts never 
even dreamed of by those in the seventh through ninth centuries, AD. The Muslim 
must therefore find a trusted mujtahid, provide him with the particulars of their 
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concern and ask for him to provide the religious ruling. The reason why ijtihad is 
critical to this discussion is if one cannot practice ijtihad today, then one can 
never derive a new legal opinion. Instead, Muslims can only imitate what has 
already been decided by the first few generations of Muslims closest to 
Muhammad as explained by the mujtahid (legal and religious expert). If this 
public discourse is followed, then ordinary Muslims will continue to depend upon 
Islamists to interpret the holy texts as understood by them, thereby impacting 
behavior. Thus, we are back to the Islamist idea that modern society must bend to 
Islam, because the matter of legal interpretation has already been settled.  
 Defining ijtihad remains an ongoing issue and can be very contentious. 
Over the last 150 years there have been several definitions of ijtihad, some more 
nuanced than others. Given its role on everyday behavior, subtle variations in 
definition can have a very real impact on practice. Ali-Karamali and Dunne 
(1994, p.240) provide various sources of nuanced definitions of ijtihad with some 
definitions mentioning Muslim jurists and others do not. The definitions that 
include jurists necessitate their inclusion. The definitions that do not mention 
jurists could assume individual Muslims may be able to exercise ijtihad. al-
Muhairi (1995) says there is a consensus within the scholarly community of the 
role of ijtihad where the Muslim jurist (Mujtahid) exercises ijtihad through 
interpreting the law of God and extending it to cover new legal problems but 
never to create new legal rules. Hence the jurist discovers the rules as prescribed 
by Allah and does not create new rules. This is a very important distinction. 
Although Allah has decreed the rules for man to live by, the formulation of those 
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rules is not axiomatic. The jurist must draw out what is present but not obvious in 
the sacred texts. Muhairi also agrees that a jurisprudential rule using ijtihad is not 
equal to the authority of a rule clearly laid out by the Shari’a texts, as the mujtahid 
deduces a legal rule by way of human reason which is always subject to error, 
therefore is never viewed with the same authority as Shari’a texts. It is the 
mujtahid’s opinion and nothing more. What is self-evident is knowledge or “Ilm”. 
What is derived from the text is a jurist’s opinion or “Zann.” Again, a Muslim 
jurist can only discover and not create new law, however, if scholars are unable to 
apply new rulings for modern situations, then Reformers will not have the 
opportunity to speak to new issues and Muslim society must defer to Islamists in 
their interpretation as understood by them. This approach fosters dependence 
upon the jurist since the ordinary Muslim cannot practice ijtihad. 
 For practical examples of the inability of Muslims to arrive at the proper 
interpretation of the jurisprudential ruling, see the website Islamicity 
(http://www.islamicity.com/qa/) that allows a Muslim to submit a question to a 
religious scholar in the “ask an imam” section. There is a caveat that the answers 
are opinions only and intended to help the Ummah (Muslim community) but 
nothing more. These are not viewed as a detailed fatwa (religious ruling) since 
that would take much more time for the religious scholar to arrive at the proper 
interpretation viz. the particular issue. Since the believer cannot use ijtihad he/she 
is left with finding an authoritative jurist to rely upon.  
 Next I will discuss the question of whether the closure of the gate of 
ijtihad has arisen in reality. How the ulema (Muslim scholars) approach this 
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discussion as it has very real implications on action, particularly within modern 
society. Yet if ijtihad remains open for today, then who can practice ijtihad 
(however it is defined) also becomes crucial. 
Ijtihad closure 
 Scholars refer to the modern discussion on ijtihad as the “gate of ijtihad,” 
with scholars in the last 100 years falling into one of three categories regarding 
ijtihad - ijtihad is closed altogether, ijtihad was never closed, and indecision on 
whether ijtihad is closed, each with their own problems in making their 
arguments. Thus the scholars who say the gate of independent reasoning has not 
been closed have the burden of defending whom and under what conditions 
ijtihad can be practiced. This adds a burden upon the Reformer who must then 
explain before even beginning the question of hermeneutics how ijtihad has not in 
fact been closed. Until Reformers provide an authoritative, compelling counter-
narrative to Islamist ideology and ideas such as taqlid, Islamists will continue to 
have the upper hand concerning the authoritative narrative and they will continue 
to pursue a global caliphate whether through violent or non-violent means. 
Ordinary Muslims will have no choice but to follow if there are no opposing, 
authoritative views. 
 The term itself “closure of the gate of ijtihad” is a recent development as 
scholars began using the term after Joseph Schacht’s (1902-1969) work titled “An 
Introduction to Islamic Law” in 1964 on the subject. Weiderhold (1996) says the 
Western understanding of Islamic jurisprudence has been deeply influenced by 
Joseph Schacht’s claim of the closure of the gate of ijtihad and Codd (1999) holds 
69 
the prevailing view of Islamic law after approximately 900 A.D. referencing 
Schacht as well and others deferring to Schacht’s “closure,” the gate of ijtihad 
was closed resulting in stagnation of Islamic Law. As a result of this perceived 
closure, Islamic Law was never to evolve into a system of positive law, and 
ijtihad was replaced with taqlid as the norm.  
 I believe that although the so-called closure may have not occurred in 
reality, since this was the perception among scholars, the closure has therefore 
become the de facto reality. What this means is that although Muslims are able to 
allow for ijtihad to deal with matters of modernity, for those who believe the gate 
was already closed, no true Muslim could be allowed to come up with a new 
interpretation but must simply defer to imitating Muhammad regardless of the 
peoples, places or time period. Instead of allowing the interpretation of the holy 
texts to conform to modernity, everyone living in the modern era must conform to 
the holy texts as understood and defined by those closest to Muhammad in time 
and relationship.  
 Wiederhold (1996) argues there are two discourses between Muslim 
scholars going back to the ninth century. The first allows for the practice of ijtihad 
under certain conditions with the second discourse that of Western scholars who 
in the nineteenth century asserted there was a consensus among Muslim legal 
scholars on the closure of the door of ijtihad yet without sufficient evidence to 
support this assumption. I do not argue these Western scholars invented the idea 
of the closure of the gate of ijtihad but they merely recognized the belief of the 
ulema (Muslim scholars) as their belief in the closure, which became the 
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dominant discourse and remains the dominant discourse among Islamists to this 
day (Ali-Karamali & Dunne 1994, p.254) 
 Ali-Karamali & Dunne (1994) say most scholars who agree that ijtihad is 
now closed defer to the four orthodox Muslim schools (madhahibs) as the arbiters 
of orthodoxy. This means the gate of ijtihad officially closed from the ninth 
century A.D. onward. Ali-Karamali & Dunne (1994) note several twentieth 
century authors who deny the closure of the gate of ijtihad including Wael Hallaq 
(1984), Mohammad Iqbal (1930), Abdul Rahim (1911), Albert Hourani (1962) 
and H.A.R. Gibb (1962). Hallaq (1984, p. 4) says ijtihad was indispensible 
because it was the only means by which jurists could reach the judicial judgments 
decreed by Allah. He further makes the case for the non-closure of ijtihad by 
arguing jurists capable of ijtihad existed at all times, ijtihad was used in 
developing positive law after the formation of the schools (bold added for 
emphasis), until 500 years after Muhammad’s death there was no mention of the 
closure or anything related to it, and the controversy about the closure of ijtihad 
and the extinction of mujtahids (i.e., individuals who are legal and religious 
experts in Islamic law and can practice ijtihad) prevented jurists from reaching a 
consensus on the closure. Additionally, Hallaq (1984) asks why none of the four 
founders of the madhahibs [Muslim schools] mentioned this, nor any of their 
followers if the gate to ijtihad closed. Such a significant event would probably not 
be left unmentioned if this actually occurred in reality. Hallaq claims that given 
the lack of any evidence in the affirmative this was more than likely that the 
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founders of the four schools believed the gate to ijtihad was not closed and the 
idea is a modern invention with very real life impact.  
 Ali-Karamali and Dunne (1994) state that even when scholars asserted the 
gate of ijtihad was closed they also offered seemingly contradictory statements 
that it had not in fact been closed. Further, they claim Ignaz Goldziher (1850-
1921) is noted by many as the father of modern Islamic law yet he never 
mentioned a closing of the door of ijtihad. One more pivotal issue is they ask if 
the closing of the door of ijtihad were such a critical and importance concept in 
Islamic law and history, then how could this have been left unmentioned by the 
father of modern Islamic scholarship? They say Goldziher may not have 
mentioned this because the phrase never became famous until Count Leon 
Ostrorog (1867-1932). Rahman says, “It was not until very modern times that an 
attempt was made by means of the doctrine of taqlid [consensus/imitation] to 
confine the Court and the jurists to one of the four Schools of law from the 
others” (Ali-Karamali & Dunne, 1994, p. 249). Thus we see two widespread, 
oppositional camps within Islam. On the one hand we have Islamists who think 
the closure of the gate of ijtihad has closed for all times with scholars saying the 
door never closed but is open under certain conditions. 
 Of course, one could argue the principles apply, but then we are still left 
with the dilemma of who interprets the principles for modern day issues and 
under what guidelines? There are certainly those who make claims on what the 
U.S. Founding Fathers intended for today but these are principles, not every day 
practical rules to follow regarding modernity. These are issues Islamists are 
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forced to argue for given twenty-first century issues were not even dreamed of in 
the ninth century as the Islamist argues for much more than just principles but 
seeks to control behavior of both Muslims and non-Muslims through their 
understanding of Islam as defined by those closest to Muhammad. 
 Muhammad is reported in Hadith 1/116 to say “my Ummah shall not agree 
upon error.” Therefore, if the consensus of the community argues for anything, 
then according to Muhammad, it must be accepted. If the gate of ijtihad has 
closed, then the Ummah must have come together at some point and actually 
agreed upon banning independent thinking. To my knowledge, there are no 
Islamic scholars who have described such a meeting let alone an agreement upon 
banning ijtihad. Further, this ban on independent thinking would appear to be a 
performative contradiction given that each member of the Ummah would have to 
arrive at a ban of independent thinking by their respective independent thinking. 
This is similar to those who use logic to argue that one should not use logic. Or it 
would be akin to writing “I cannot write anything in the English language.”   
Therefore, it does not make any sense that the Ummah would ban independent 
thinking unless they want to continue with the anti-rationalism espoused by Al-
Ghazali (which I will touch upon later) because the Muslim community is 
comprised of individuals by definition. And if the individuals decide to cut off 
individual thinking they must utilize their individual thinking to do so. Rahman 
(1994) confirms this untenable position by noting that to establish Hadith (part of 
the necessary makeup of Shari’a) one needed Ijma (consensus), which closed the 
door of ijtihad; however, once hadith had been established by consensus, it ousted 
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consensus by its very logic. So, individual scholars arrived at consensus one 
assumes by independent reason to say there was no independent reasoning and 
collectively concurred that there was only one version of acceptable Hadith and 
ultimately Shari’a. 
  To use an American example to illustrate, ijtihad is to state law what 
clearly delineated rules are to federal law. The U.S. doctrine of pre-emption 
ensures state law cannot pre-empt federal law. In the same way, neither can 
ijtihad pre-empt clearly spelled out rules in the Quran and Hadith (Shari’a). So, 
for the mujtahid [Muslim scholar], as long as the scholar’s ijtihad does not 
displace the Shari’a, it is considered valid. What this means is that if the Quran is 
silent on any given issue, then the mujtahid can provide a ruling on modern 
problems as they arise. Therefore, the modern day Muslim need not live in 
paralysis with anything not already clearly spelled out by the Quran and can 
appeal to a mujtahid to clear up any confusion that the Quran is silent on. As 
noted, the Muslim can even go to a website to ask an imam what their ruling is on 
any given subject. What this means practically is that one can still be a faithful 
Muslim and live in the modern world. This also takes away the Islamist narrative 
that the uncreated word of the Quran is inimitable along with the Hadith and 
already sufficient to speak to every affair in the Muslim’s life, which I develop 
further in the next chapter on Islamic law. 
HT and hermeneutics  
Although interpretation concerns are by no means unique to Islam, what is 
unique is the logical conclusion of the strident belief in the uncreated nature of the 
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Quran and therefore the potential desire for Islamists to apply the holy text for not 
just Muslims but violently towards all non-Muslims. This is more than a doctrine 
found within a religious book but has a very real impact upon Muslims given the 
reverence with which the Islamic holy texts is accorded due to its uncreated 
nature that dictates a literalistic interpretation only. 
 HT demonstrates a case for why the non-Muslim scholar must depend 
upon a qualified Muslim jurist to interpret the holy text for them hence fostering 
dependence, presumably upon them. HT Britain says 
Do you know all the various laws of Deen? Are you capable of 
extracting and deriving the laws pertaining to wudhu, salaah, 
zakaah, etc. directly from the Qur'an and Hadith? Do you know 
which Hadith has abrogated another? Do you have the ability to 
reconcile between the various Ahadith which apparently contradict 
each other? Do you know which verses of the Qur'an are general in 
their application and which verses are qualified by other texts? 
(Khan, 2003 p.3) 
Such questioning could intimidate even an Islamic scholar, not to mention 
someone untrained in the legal nuances and complexities found within Islamic 
law.  Thus it fosters a dependence upon organizations like HT and others who 
claim to do the work for them that is orthodox and therefore authoritative.  
 Interpretation of holy texts (hermeneutics) has been utilized by Muslim 
scholars since the beginning of Islam to apply Islamic principles to new situations 
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never addressed by Muslim scholars; however, Fuller says many current Islamists 
claim these interpretations have no merit. He says 
Many modernist Islamists claim that past interpretations of Islamic 
scholars lack any inherent authority and are of interest and worthy 
of respect only as a reflection of the Muslim experience in the past. 
They are in no way binding or necessarily even relevant to 
contemporary needs. (Fuller, 2003, p. 14) 
Fuller allowed for many versions of Islamism, saying Political Islam will 
continually change and that there will be multiple understandings and 
interpretations of Islam in politics and society and it is more accurate to refer to 
Islamisms. This of course is the struggle between the Islamist and the Reformer - 
whether the holy text as understood by those closest to Muhammad in the early 
generations of Islam have said all there is to say about the holy text or if a Muslim 
can interpret the text in light of modern conditions. 
 Professor Sadik al’Azm says of Muslim religious institutions that 
They [Islamic religious institutions] are filled with repetitiveness, 
ossification, regression, protecting [particular] interests, 
perpetuating the status quo, and submission to the ruling authority. 
If the state is socialist, the Mufti becomes a socialist; if the rulers 
are at war, the clerics are pro-war; if the governments pursue 
peace, the [religious authorities] follow them. This is part of the 
barrenness of these institutions. This [forms a] vacuum in religious 
thought that is filled by the [intellectual] descendants and followers 
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of Sayyid Qutb, for example, and that type of violent 
fundamentalist Islam. (The Middle East Media Research Institute, 
2008 - http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2786.htm) 
 This is the danger I have sought to portray of putting the power in the 
hands of Islamist ideologues for any ruler can make any claim and pursue any 
action so long as they receive the support of the religious authorities. Without 
independent reasoning, ordinary Muslims are left to follow the authority of their 
rulers without having any recourse. Unless Reformers can come along with a 
counter-narrative that is first constructed by Muslim jurists to put in the place of 
Islamism, ordinary Muslims will continue to have no other options if the majority 
discourse is that of Islamism which can lead to violent Islamism. 
 Ideally, one can only represent Islam after much religious training. 
However, this is not always the case and can leave interpretations open to anyone 
who can take specific verses out of context or disregard for the particular 
historical events and situation in which the verse was recorded and the verse(s) 
may not be for all people’s for all places and for all times. Nor may the verse call 
for a literalist interpretation but the individual may interpret it as such and again, 
use it to justify any particular worldview, which could include the use of violence. 
Thus the danger of not knowing who has the authority to represent Islam is 
anyone can apply their own interpretation of Islam and select verses that justify 
their respective worldview; as Osama bin Laden, Zayman al-Zawahiri and Abu 
Musab Zarqawi have done to justify murder (as three examples of many).  
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 Muhammad Sa’id al-‘Ashmawi, a specialist in comparative and Islamic 
law at Cairo University says that Shari’a is different than Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) and that scholars must newly interpret Islamic jurisprudence in every time 
period. Therefore a blind acceptance of the existing corpus of Islamic 
jurisprudence is highly debatable and must be subject to constant interpretation 
(Fuller, 2003).  This is critical because if Shari’a and fiqh function on separate 
tracks, then it is the responsibility of the Muslim to understand the decrees of 
Allah given their particular time and location. This then sits in direct contrast with 
the Islamists belief that Islamic jurisprudence and Shari’a are one and the same 
and therefore are not subject to constant interpretation regardless of the particular 
time, place or peoples, that society must conform to their understanding of Islam 
and not vice versa. This means Islamists can claim a literalist interpretation of 
Islam and stress the violent verses in the Quran as abrogating the non-violent 
ones. 
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Chapter 6 
Islamists 
It necessary to investigate whom these Islamist beliefs originated with 
given the approach of this paper that belief affects behavior and conversely that 
behavior affects belief. So, in looking at violent Islamism, we must begin with the 
intellectual foundations that foster the conditions for violent Islamism. I argue the 
intellectual foundation of modern Islamism includes Hasan al-Banna, Abu Ala-
Mawdudi, Sayid Qutb, and Sayid imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl), respectively. French 
scholar Gilles Kepel says, “The theoretical basis for the Islamist movement was 
devised in the late 1960s by the ideologists [Sayid Abu A’la] Mawdudi in 
Pakistan, [Sayid] Qutb in Egypt, and [Ayatollah] Khomeini in Iran” (Gilles, 2006, 
p. 5).  I also include Hasan al-Banna in this foundation because he is the founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. I end with Dr. Fadl as a transitionary figure between 
Islamist and Reformer although I would not put him in the Reformer category. Dr. 
Fadl was the spiritual leader (emir) of al Qaeda but has since distanced himself 
from his earlier justification for violent Islamism and repudiated it through an 
updated work titled “Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World.”  His earlier 
work titled “The Essentials of Making Ready for Jihad” however still has a 
residual impact as Zayman al Zahiri modified it to suit al Qaeda’s violent Islamist 
ends. When talking about the intellectual foundation of Islamism, most 
discussions focus on Mawdudi and Qutb. I also include al-Banna since he started 
the Brotherhood, a significant political organization that functions independently 
in several countries.  
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Syed Abul ala Mawdudi 
 Mawdudi was a pioneer in Islamist ideology and influenced Sayyid Qutb in 
no small manner. If he only influenced Qutb, that would have been enough to 
make a significant mark in modern Islamism, but he was also a prolific writer and 
political organizer. Nasr (1996) says the ideas of men like Mawdudi, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and Qutb are essential to understanding contemporary Islamic thought. 
He says Mawdudi is of particular importance because he was “one of the first 
Islamic thinkers to develop a systematic political reading of Islam and a plan for 
social action to realize his vision. His creation of a coherent Islamic state, 
constitutes the essential breakthrough that led to the rise of contemporary 
revivalism.” (Nasr, 1996, p. 3) He essentially brought about the marriage of 
mosque and state. Before Mawdudi, the ideology for the most part has always 
been around since the first few generations of Islam; however, the systematic 
political structure really took tangible form with Mawdudi.  
 Mawdudi wrote a book called Jihad in Islam in 1927, which called for jihad 
as the means to establish political Islam and to forcibly spread this ideology to the 
entire world. As noted, this is a new turn within Islamism, namely, jihad as the 
means to obtaining a global caliphate and spreading Islamism to the entire world. 
Although mainstream scholars denounced him at the time, he did grow in 
popularity and established a political party he called Jamaat-i-Islami (A Brief 
History of Islamism. The Quilliam Foundation, p.7). Global Security, a 
comprehensive online source for global security related issues says of Mawdudi, 
“Perhaps no other Muslim intellectual in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
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offered such elaborate ideas on political, economic and social dimensions of Islam 
as we find it’s in the writings of Sayyid Maududi” (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-
2010 - http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/ji.htm). 
 Quilliam concurs and goes further saying  
He [Mawdudi] continues to be an inspirational figure for a number 
of ‘revivalist’ movements which are still active in the UK and 
North America. His popularizing of religious slogans as a means of 
galvanizing the masses continues to be a popular tactic adopted by 
political parties in Pakistan…Mawdudi also left behind a body of 
works that provide inspiration for Islamists and Jihadists all over 
the world. His work also influenced the ideas of a young Egyptian 
man, who had just returned from a difficult spell in the US (A Brief 
History of Islamism. The Quilliam Foundation, p.8-9). 
 This Egyptian man was Sayyid Qutb who needs no introduction in Islamic 
circles. 
Sayyid Qutb 
 Qutb is a major figure in Islamist ideology, and I devote considerable time 
to his primary source material from his 1964 work Milestones, as both Islamists 
and Reformers agree that this particular work has played a significant role in 
Islamist ideology. The United States Military Academy says of Qutb that he is the 
foremost and the most influential “Jihadi theorists” noting “jihadis” (i.e., what the 
U.S. Military Academy calls jihadis, I refer to as violent Islamists) cite Qutb more 
than any other modern author (McCants et al., 2005). Similar to when a scholar is 
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cited on numerous occasions by her colleagues, so too Qutb holds sway among 
Islamists, having been cited more than any other Islamist according to the U.S. 
Military Academy. The recognition of Qutb by other violent Islamists is an 
accurate indicator of influence Qutb has on the modern era’s discussion of violent 
Islamism.   
 Qutb’s main argument is Muslim societies all over the world reverted to 
jahaliya (ignorance) or pre-Islamic ignorance because they did not refer to Allah 
in all matters. This argument was not the first time it was used; however, it was 
the first time it was combined with Islamism. He also popularized the idea of 
forcibly removing governments through armed struggle and vehemently opposed 
Democracy. Qutb was charged with treason due to his connection to a plot by the 
Brotherhood to assassinate the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (Isseroff, 
2008) and was summarily executed by the Egyptian government in 1966 by 
hanging (A Brief History of Islamism. The Quilliam Foundation, p.11). 
 Just like Al-Ghazali did in the ninth century with his work Incoherence of 
the Philosophers, so too Qutb at the outset of his work Milestones ensures that no 
one can question Islam on a theoretical basis. Recall that Al-Ghazali is the one 
who said all those who pursue the teachings of philosophy have two options - 
execution by the sword or conversion to Islam. He creates the conditions such that 
one cannot even question his interpretation of Islam. Qutb does this when he says 
Islam is not a theory to be studied saying this theoretical approach brings Allah’s 
method into a manmade system. He says, 
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When we try to make Islam into a ‘theory’ to be studied, we 
remove the Divine method and Divine outlook from its character, 
and we reduce it to the level of a man-made system of thought, as 
if the Divine method were inferior to man’s methods, and as if we 
wanted to elevate the system of thought and action ordained by 
God to the level of the systems of His creatures! (Qutb, 1964, p. 
41) 
He justified his “theory” by arguing that all Allah cared for was submission, i.e. 
practical action and not theorizing. He believed that by his writing of Milestones 
he was submitting to the will of Allah and leading other Muslims into the true 
purity found in Islam as originally intended when much of what he saw was 
jahaliya (ignorance) and similar to the conditions before Gabriel delivered the 
holy texts to Muhammad. 
 However, the problem still remains that without understanding the first 
principles of Islam and contemplating the theory behind Islamic doctrine, the 
Muslim cannot determine whose interpretation of Islam they must follow but 
instead will defer to whichever authority they trust and therefore who has the 
power by way of controlling the discourse. Quite often, this happens to be 
whatever local Islamic community one belongs to. The difficulty lies in that the 
Muslim must still at some level utilize their reason to decide who they will 
follow. But if reason is negated from the outset, and especially with problematic 
passages found within the holy text, the Muslim can in reality only hope (or have 
faith) that they are obeying the true will of Allah.  
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 Qutb says “Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from 
the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of God 
alone, deriving guidance from Him alone, and bowing before Him alone” (Qutb, 
1964, p. 11).  This raises the question of faith viz. reason which is beyond my 
scope here, however, Qutb does beg the question, the Islamic way of life as 
defined by whom? Qutb nowhere argues that individual Muslims get to decide on 
their own through independent reason, but must submit to Allah’s voice on earth 
as defined, presumably by him or any other accepted authority. And guidance 
from the Quran and Hadith as interpreted by whom? How does one know, 
especially without ijtihad that the guidance is indeed from Allah and not merely 
another man’s interpretation of Allah’s guidance? These types of questions are 
already answered for the Islamist but the Reformer is not content and stresses the 
importance of ijtihad to arrive at these answers by the use of one’s independent 
reason.  
 Qutb believes he had historical precedence in turning only to the Quran by 
saying Muhammad intentionally limited the first generation of Muslims to one 
source of guidance only - the Quran. He juxtaposes this with Umar, a 
contemporary of Muhammad who turned to a different source other than the 
Quran saying Muhammad was displeased with Umar for doing so. Qutb says 
In fact, the Messenger of God – peace be upon him – intended to 
prepare a generation pure in heart, pure in mind, pure in 
understanding. Their training was to be based on the method 
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prescribed by God Who gave the Qur’an, purified from the 
influence of all other sources. (Qutb, 1964, p. 17) 
These other sources Qutb referred to were Greek philosophy and logic, ancient 
Persian legends and their ideas, Jewish scripture and traditions, Christian theology 
along with fragments of other civilizations and cultures.  
 Qutb framed his argument in such a way that it would be impossible for 
the true Muslim to defer to any other source, including the utilization of one’s 
reason. Qutb’s Milestones was first published in 1964 and before the 1967 Six 
Day War that left such an indelible mark upon Islamic society. Thus, the timing of 
this work was perfect to have the maximum impact upon the religious and 
decision makers in Islamic society given the religious vacuum filled by the defeat 
of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism. If the Muslim society was ever ready to embrace the 
void of President Nasser’s secular pan-Arabism, it was very shortly after the 
publication of Qutb’s magnus opus. The void of Nasser’s pan-Arabism left 
Islamic society with little else other than the Hanbali/Ash’ari/Al-Ghazali 
fundamentalism that Qutb was so powerful in explicating and applying for the 
modern era. It is statements like this where Qutb says 
Thus we can say without any reservations that the main reason for 
the difference between the first unique and distinguished group of 
Muslims and later Muslims is that the purity of the first source of 
Islamic guidance was mixed with various other sources, as we 
have indicated. (Qutb, 1964, p. 17) 
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He gave a shell-shocked Islamic community a nostalgia for the past and a hope 
for the future (Susser, 2002). A hope that could only come about through a 
doubling up on religiosity and going back to the purity once believed to be in the 
earliest years of Islam. 
 Qutb stressed cutting off altogether from all influences of jahaliya 
(ignorance) and return to the pure source of the Quran as the only source of 
guidance from which the Muslim also derive their “concepts of life, principles of 
government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life” (Qutb, 1964, p. 21). 
The Quran is all sufficient for everyday living and all affairs of man on Qutb’s 
view, even if it is silent on modern affairs.  
 It is no surprise that Qutb’s views on the sovereignty of Allah are strikingly 
similar to the Ash’ari and Al-Ghazali view since they all approach the holy texts 
in a literalistic manner. Qutb refers to Allah’s sovereignty as his greatest attribute 
(Qutb, 1964, p. 25). I see no distinction between the Ash’arite view of 
Voluntarism and Qutb’s view, as they both valued Allah’s sovereignty as the 
highest of his virtues at the expense of all other virtues and reason itself. This 
Voluntarism that is shared by both means Allah’s power is not even limited by the 
laws of logic including the law of non-contradiction, one of the many laws that 
governs reason. They both would deny Aristotle’s supposition who said 
Neither can there be an intermediate between contradictories, but 
of each subject it is necessary either to affirm or deny one thing. 
This first becomes evident when people define what truth and 
falsity are; for to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is, is 
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false; and to say that what is, is, or that what is not, is not, is true. 
Hence he who affirms that something is or is not will say either 
what is true or what is false. But neither what is nor what is not is 
said to be or not to be. (Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Bekker 
number 1011b23-29) 
 Of course this means Qutb runs into the same logical contradictions that the 
Ash’ari did where a thing can be both true and not true at the same time. if Allah 
has willed it to be so. On the Ash’arite view, Allah is not subject to the laws of 
logic. Thus, Ash’ari, Al-Ghazali and now Qutb can accuse anyone of takfir 
[apostasy] for saying Allah cannot approve violence if he wishes to pursue 
whatever ends he so desires that abrogation seems to solve. A seemingly horrific 
act of terrorism can become a just act simply because Allah has willed it to be so 
based upon their understanding of Allah’s directives as applied to modern day 
situations. This is of no consequence to Qutb for what he values is action, not 
theory (Qutb, p.33). The reader will recall Qutb’s denigration of contemplation 
and his emphasis on action when he said Islam is not intended to be studied like a 
theory and brought into a man made method (Qutb, p.41) 
Thus, one must not understand to act, one needs only to act and submit. As noted 
earlier, this can have detrimental consequences for society if the authority says it 
is Allah’s will to murder non-Muslim civilians, those who are inclined toward this 
ideology will commit acts of murder as already mentioned. Therefore to prevent 
the actions without the use of force is to counter the ideology, which I will discuss 
later under the section on Reformers. Thus while reformers may believe 
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individual Muslims can find own understanding, they still need to provide a 
strong version to direct those who just follow. 
 Regarding the Muslim’s role in society and the allowance for submission 
to an individual or state that does not interpret the Shari’a as Qutb does is 
forbidden. Qutb says 
It is necessary that the believers in this faith be autonomous and 
have power in their own society, so that they may be able to 
implement this system and give currency to all its laws. (Qutb, 
1964, p. 33) 
Further, “true social justice can come to a society only after all affairs have been 
submitted to the laws of God…” (Qutb, 1964, p. 27).  I believe one can make a 
good case that the closest resemblance we see to Qutbism or Qutb ideology is 
found in Saudi Arabia or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Imagine if the entire world 
lived under the same type of religious and political structure as Saudi Arabia and 
you will have a good idea of what Qutbism looks like in practice. This would be a 
world where women are unequal to men, human rights are trampled, women 
cannot drive, someone’s hand could be cut off for stealing and the death penalty 
for conversion to another religion as a few examples (BBC News, 2002 - 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2366419.stm) 
Dr. Fadl - Before and After 
 Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, primarily known as Dr. Fadl, was a former leader 
of the Egyptian group al Jihad and part of the original core of al Qaeda, being 
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their spiritual leader. He was also one of the first members of Al Qaeda’s top 
council.  
 I devote considerable time to Dr. Fadl, most of which is taken from 
Lawrence Wright’s New Yorker piece (Wright 2008), because his example 
demonstrates that it is indeed possible to counter the narrative of violent Islamism 
from within Islam even though he does not go far enough in denouncing violent 
jihad. He is a perfect example of the great counter-narrative work that can come 
out of a violent Islamist position into a repudiation of that same violence. Wright 
has also written the Looming Tower (2006), which is the most comprehensive 
account we have of al Qaeda to date. What Wright’s piece illustrates is if the 
spiritual leader of al Qaeda and the man who literally wrote the book that justifies 
the violent ideology that drives al Qaeda could recognize and publicly 
acknowledge the error of such an ideology, it can be done within other 
organizations as well. What exactly can we learn from this example and how can 
we apply it moving forward if indeed this is considered a good approach? I hope 
to answer these questions in the discussion.  
 David Blair, writing in a British newspaper notes Dr. Fadl’s impact on the 
violent Islamist movement and says “Twenty years ago, Dr Fadl became al-
Qaeda's intellectual figurehead with a crucial book setting out the rationale for 
global jihad against the West. Today; however, he believes the killing must be 
justified and the killing of innocent people (as defined by him) is both contrary to 
Islam and a strategic error. "Every drop of blood that was shed or is being shed in 
Afghanistan and Iraq is the responsibility of bin Laden and Zawahiri and their 
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followers," writes Dr Fadl.” (Blair, 2009, p.1). Yet, he clearly has a major role in 
the same bloodshed he accuses bin Laden and Zawahiri; however, it is 
encouraging to see such a transformation and the world has yet to see what kind 
of impact this repudiation will have upon future generations of would be violent 
Islamists because of his newfound role as former insider turned critic. 
 Dr. Fadl had memorized the Quran by the sixth grade and became so 
respected that most of al-Jihad assumed he was the emir rather than Zayman al-
Zawahiri (al Qaeda’s current second in command under Osama bin Laden). Al-
Jihad was the Egyptian terrorist group that eventually became the core of al 
Qaeda leadership. Zawahiri often deferred to Fadl in Islamic jurisprudence. Fadl’s 
writings had a monumental impact upon al Qaeda, specifically in the use of 
violence and its justification via the Quran. This is why his renouncement of 
violence with Islamic jurisprudence to back up these new claims was a 
devastating blow to al Qaeda and one of the main reasons Zawahiri and al Qaeda 
sought so desperately to discredit him (Wright 2008). For when Dr. Fadl spoke, 
people listened. His two books became two of the most important books in 
Islamist discourse (Wright, 2008). His renunciation was all the more important 
because he challenged the authority of al Qaeda. It’s one thing for an outsider to 
question the jurisprudential interpretation of Islamism and the justification of 
violence; however, coming from within carries much more weight. Diaa Rashwan 
of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies said the renunciation 
by Dr. Fadl was genuine and was a cause for shock and confusion in the Islamist 
world because “Jihadis will see hundreds of their former brothers criticisising 
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their most fundamental ideas. That’s why Zawahiri is so bothered by it.” (Black, 
2007).  
 Dr. Fadl’s new work weakened the underpinnings for the ideology that 
drives the recruitment, retention and violence that comes about due to violent 
Islamist ideology. While in Tora prison, Egypt, Dr. Fadl sent a fax stating “We 
are prohibited from committing aggression, even if the enemies of Islam do that.” 
(Wright, 2008, p.2)  As we have seen, this flies directly in the face of Islamist 
ideology as propagated by HT and others who argue for offensive jihad as the 
means to establish a global caliphate.  
 As a historical anchor, Dr. Fadl and Zawahiri lived during the rule of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt (1956-1970) which, as discussed above, pan 
Arabism and nationalistic fervor took hold in much of the Islamic world until 
Nasser was resoundingly and publicly defeated by Israel. This is argued to have 
resulted in an increasing number of Egyptians becoming disillusioned with 
Nasser’s secular political ideology and instead turning to the mosque and Islam 
for answers (Wright, 2008).  
 Fadl’s text “The Essential Guide for Preparation” appeared in 1998 and is 
the first work that al Qaeda used as justification for perennial conflict and violent 
Islamist ideology. It begins with the premise that jihad is the natural state of 
Islam. Muslims must always be in conflict with nonbelievers, resorting to peace 
only in moments of abject weakness. Because jihad is, above all, a religious 
exercise, there are divine rewards to be gained. He who gives money for jihad will 
be compensated in Heaven, but not as much as the person who performs jihad. 
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The greatest prize goes to the martyr. Dr. Fadl continued the argument saying 
every able-bodied believer is obligated to engage in forcible jihad, as most 
Muslim countries are ruled by infidels who must be forcibly removed, to bring 
about an Islamic state. He wrote, “The way to bring an end to the rulers’ unbelief 
is armed rebellion” (Wright, 2008, p.6).  
 Dr. Fadl’s second work “The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine 
Knowledge” first appeared in 1994 and begins saying salvation is available only 
to the perfect Muslim. A lengthy overview of this book is necessary as it had such 
a monumental impact upon Islamism and al Qaeda in particular. Fadl stated that 
even an exemplary believer could wander off the path to Paradise with a single 
misstep. He also stated the President of Egypt and the rulers of Arab countries are 
apostates of Islam, and therefore are fair game. This gave Muslims the theological 
justification to commit coup de tat whenever possible. Dr. Fadl says 
The infidel’s rule, his prayers, and the prayers of those who pray 
behind him are invalid. His blood is legal…I say to Muslims in all 
candor that secular, nationalist democracy opposes your religion 
and your doctrine, and in submitting to it you leave God’s book 
behind. (Wright, 2008, p.8) 
 He later repudiated his second work with a new book to “synthesize” his 
previous views on the justification for jihad and attacking both non-Muslims and 
Muslim rulers. His book “Rationalizing Jihad” was published in November-
December of 2007 and establishes a new set of rules for jihad and restricts the 
possibility of holy war to extremely rare circumstances (The Middle East Media 
92 
Research Institute, 2007c). Wright says every word of this new treatise assaulted 
the world view of the violent Islamists and “brought into question their own 
chances for salvation” (Wright, 2008, p.18). The reason why this particular point 
is so critical is because when one’s eternal salvation is on the line, whether this is 
true to the reality of what is matters not for this is the truth of the believer and 
another reason why belief is so critical to understanding. For bad belief leads to 
bad behavior. 
 If one thinks that one is commanded/compelled/mandated to kill someone 
who either does not claim the name of Islam or one who does but does not live 
externally according to the precise interpretation of those whom one trusts to 
explain the Shari’a accurately, then one has no choice but to take their life. 
Because Allah commands it, it is now accepted and is not murder. Especially in 
certain cases where such behavior is glamorized, honored and highly valued in 
certain societies and one’s family is taken care of, it makes such action all the 
more enticing because it is now legitimated and honorable through the 
glorification of martyrdom. 
 Dr. Fadl continues in the new rules for rationalizing violent jihad. He says 
there is no such thing in Islam as ends justifying the means…There 
are those who strike and then escape, leaving their families, 
dependents and other Muslims to suffer the consequences. This is 
in no way religion or jihad. It is not manliness. 
(Wright, 2008, p.18) 
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This is still considered forcible jihad, however, there are now rules and 
regulations one can only commit jihad under that will be acceptable to Allah 
according to Dr. Fadl. Since these new requirements for jihad came from the man 
who wrote the proverbial book on the justification for violent jihad, this new work 
carries much more weight than a criticism from the outside, especially a criticism 
from the West. Such a respected Muslim, a jurisprudential scholar who has such a 
depth of Shari’a understanding who calls terrorism a sin carries much more 
authority and is very likely the only way violent Islamists will turn to non-
violence. As the Quilliam Foundation has noted, a counter-narrative must be 
presented, and it must be presented from within the Muslim community 
(Ummah), preferably from respected authorities. Dr. Zuhdi Jasser of course is a 
notable figure who is a practicing Muslim that offers such a counter-narrative. For 
a counter-narrative to succeed it must therefore be: 
- From within the Muslim community 
- Comprehensive 
- Authoritative (perceived to come from a respected source)  
 What we can learn from Dr. Fadl’s example is that reform is possible. He 
repudiated violent Islam but in a different way than Reformers do, however, he 
has shown us that it is possible, even if only in degrees.  The most violent of 
Islamist can turn away from such an ideology if presented new information. 
Second, an Islamic reformation must come from within Islam for any counter-
narrative from outside of Islam will be attacked immediately as un-Islamic, 
foreign, anti-Islamic, false and therefore will be repudiated. Such a repudiation is 
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most effective by former Islamists who attack the violent Islamist ideology as 
promoted by Mawdudi, Qutb, al-Banna and al Qaeda and then provide a positive, 
comprehensive, authoritative counter-narrative in its place. It is yet to be seen if 
Dr. Fadl will turn into a credible Reformer, however, I note his contribution here 
simply to show that even someone in what most of the entire world considers the 
worst of organizations in al Qaeda can change their point of view and combat 
such destructive ideas.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) 
 We have already touched on HT but it is necessary to go even further into 
their history and ideology given their worldwide reach and appeal. HT began 
through the work of an appeals court judge from Palestine named Taqiuddin al-
Nabhani (1909-1977). Like Qutb, Nabhani was concerned about the emerging 
influences of Western political ideas and the establishment of the modern state of 
Israel. Nabhani formed HT as a political party with the aim of establishing an 
Islamist super state. He was close to the Muslim Brotherhood and for a time many 
people thought of HT as an offshoot of the Brotherhood in the same way Hamas 
is considered the Palestinian arm of the Brotherhood (Quilliam 2010). Because 
Nabhani was a former member of the Ba’thist party, he was also heavily 
influenced by Arab nationalism. “He maintained his Arab-centric outlook but 
presented it in the Islamic language of a super ‘Islamic’ state – concentrating on 
the Arabic-speaking Muslims – superimposed on his Arab super-nation state 
concept (A Brief History of Islamism. The Quilliam Foundation, p.5).”
 Nabhani was the first to take Islamist ideology and what arguably began 
95 
with Hasan al-Banna and produced a detailed constitution for this future Islamic 
supremacist state that included social, political and economic systems. “Nabhani 
maintained that Islam was not a faith but a political ideology that pre-defined how 
a government should be structured and run. Whilst al-Banna had spoken in vague 
terms about ‘Islamic governance’, Nabhani crystallized these ideas and produced 
a blue print (A Brief History of Islamism. The Quilliam Foundation, p.7).” 
Although HT floundered for decades, they flourished in the United Kingdom 
having been given the freedom to speak and recruit and they then exported their 
Islamist ideology back to their respective home countries (The Quilliam 
Foundation 2010). They have a substantial global impact through their 
recruitment and export their methodology to achieve their end goal, namely, a 
global caliphate.  
 HT’s public website indicates they do advocate violence (as also 
demonstrated earlier). However, the innuendo can be subtle. For example, HT’s 
website states:   
The teachings of Islam oblige Muslims to call for Islam 
and spread its guidance wherever and whenever 
possible. This necessitates Jihad and the conquest of 
other countries to enable people to understand it and 
contemplate the truthfulness of its rules. It also gives the 
people the choice between embracing Islam or retaining 
their faith if they so wished provided that they adhere to its 
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rules related to matters of transactions and penal code. 
(Bold added for emphasis; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010a) 
 I interpret this statement of jihad and the conquest of other countries as 
violent because this is the language that HT and other Islamists use when they 
refer to jihad. As noted earlier, HT says in The Inevitability of the Clash of 
Civlizations (p.23) jihad properly understood means initiating fighting with 
unbelievers, even if unbelievers do not initiate fighting with them.  
This also fits with the purely political approach to Islam advocated by HT. 
Although the third sentence might suggest tolerance and a non-Muslim can retain 
their faith, what this means is certain peoples do not have to convert but they have 
to pay the special tax for the privilege of not converting to Islam 
(religionfacts.com, 2004-2010). If one can believe HT at their word, it could 
suggest a lack of violent retribution once under Islamic rule as defined by them 
(assuming non-Muslims do as they are told). This is what is meant by adhering to 
matters of transactions. Most citizens pay taxes and adhere to the respective penal 
codes, however, it is unheard of for a citizen to pay a tax for not belonging to a 
particular religion. Further, adhering to the penal code means the non-Muslim 
would have to submit to Shari’a law even though they are not a member of the 
faith. In HT’s ideal society, non-Muslim would never be allowed to rule over 
Muslims and could never participate in any government structure. It also depends 
upon how one defines jihad; however, the reader will note an earlier quote from 
HT which makes it clear they refer to jihad in the sense of offensive attack against 
who they deem to be unbelievers. HT says, “…they interpreted jihad as being a 
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defensive rather than an offensive war, thus contradicting the reality of jihad.” 
(see Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2008a). 
 HT is not hesitant to seize complete power through the establishment of 
the caliphate in whatever respective countries their organizations function. They 
say 
The period of attaining and seizing the reins of power through the 
Ummah [Islamic community] to implement the ideology in a 
comprehensive manner, because it is forbidden to seize partial 
power. Hence, the arrival at the ruling must be total and the 
implementation of Islam must be comprehensive. (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
2008b) 
HT is unabashed in bringing back the caliphate, or global Islamic rule; however, 
they publicly say their organization only does this through non-violence although 
they have no problem in indoctrinating as many Muslims as possible within this 
ideology as they are active all over the world (GlobalSecurity.org, 2003) and have 
global conferences including recent ones in the United States and Australia. HT’s 
official websites include: HT Australia, HT Britain, HT Bangladesh, HT 
Denmark, HT France, HT Germany, HT Indonesia, HT Lebanon, HT Malaysia, 
HT Netherlands, HT Pakistan, HT Palestine, HT Spain, HT Turkey and HT 
Ukraine. They also have their global website and they also run and maintain the 
www.khilafah.com website. 
 HT publicly states their advocacy is for political action only and not 
violence (YouTube, 2007). Dr. Nazreen Nawaz, a spokeswoman for HT was 
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asked on BBC if HT supports a global caliphate based upon purely peaceful 
means. She responds by saying absolutely and that HT has never advocated 
terrorism. Of course this is where definitions are so critical and one must define 
advocate and terrorism. Maajid Nawaz, co-founder of the Quilliam foundation 
recounts his time as an HT party member where his recruitment of other Muslims 
into HT and his responsibility for creating the atmosphere on the college campus 
they were at the time that led to the murder of a Nigerian student by a Somali 
Muslim. Nawaz was not found guilty since he did not actually commit the 
murder.  He says his responsibility was in teaching the ideology that conveyed 
others into violent Islamism (Nawaz, 2006). HT members may not actually 
commit violent acts themselves, but they certainly foster the conditions that give 
others the theological justification to do so. See section titled Violent Islamism 
above that discusses HT’s ideology and causally linked violence. 
 Mohammad is quoted as saying there are two forms of jihad. The lesser 
jihad in which one struggles within ones’ self and the great jihad of holy war. 
Even if HT can make the argument that the teachings of Islam necessitates jihad 
as the former, critics of HT consider such an ideology a conveyor belt approach 
that provides the intellectual framework for Muslim youth to pursue 
extremism/violent Islamism (Washington Institute, 2009, p.4). Yet even this 
argument is difficult to make given the statements found on their public web sites 
in America, the United Kingdom and elsewhere advocating for jihad and conquest 
that deploys the second understanding of a holy war (see earlier chapter and 
discussion below).  
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 Walid Phares says of HT and their 2009 conference titled “Down with 
Capitalism” – “Hizb ut-Tahrir is part of the chain that produces terrorism. They 
do not blow up themselves. They are the ones who create the suicide bombers, 
intellectually” (YouTube, 2009a - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiMS-
bVsWkU&feature=related). And Frank Gaffney from the Center for Security 
Policy says of HT “they wish to use our civil liberties and free speech to destroy 
the West and civil liberties/free speech” (YouTube, 2009b 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PobtVFYbO4A&feature=related). I do not 
have a particular response to these statements by Phares and Gaffney as they 
stand on their own, however, HT has publicly said they do not engage in violence 
although as noted earlier they have been linked to and advocate for violent 
activity. However, I argue this is still HT’s responsibility since they are crystal 
clear in the call to mobilize armies coupled with their definition of jihad to 
include initiating fighting with unbelievers (see p. 102). Further, they include 
quotations such as “Jihad is a war against anyone who stands in the face of the 
Islamic Da’awa [call to preach and propagate Islam], whether he is a belligerent 
or otherwise.” This does not matter if HT leadership actually engages in violence 
because they are conveying others through their ideological indoctrination and as 
noted have direct ties to several terrorist attacks (Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir; Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, 2008a). Thus, without a change in the use of such language and 
definitions, HT’s claim that is does not promote violence must remain highly 
suspect and problematic. 
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 In spite of HT’s public declaration of non-violence to establish the 
caliphate, they have no issues with publicly saying the State of Israel must be 
destroyed through force. For an organization that claims to only utilize the 
political process to install the global caliphate, they still call for the mobilization 
of armies as the only solution to the “Jewish question.” They say  
O people: indeed Hizb ut-Tahrir strengthens your 
determination and firms up your resolve, so do you now not 
know that there is no solution except to mobilize armies, 
gathering the capable soldiers and fight the Jews? The 
armies are of your sons, and they must mobilize to fight, 
without fearing a ruler or an oppressor, rather they must 
stand in their faces and uproot them, for Allah alone has the 
greatest right to be feared and He alone is the Mighty, the 
Wise. (Bold added for emphasis; Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010b) 
 Thus while HT can claim they do not commit violent acts, however, they 
are certainly encouraging violence forthrightly. One would assume a non-violent 
organization would encourage a two state solution to the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict and urge a peaceful resolution to the issue, not mobilization of armies. If 
they are willing to proactively encourage violence towards the Jews, there is little 
to discourage them from promoting violence towards anyone, even if they do not 
commit the actual violent act. Like Maajid Nawaz, their conveyance makes them 
just as responsible for the violence.  
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 Where does HT stand on the hermeneutical approach to the holy text and 
why is this relevant to our discussion? HT says 
To embrace Islam as a way of thinking and a way of action 
is a difficult task. Those who are willing to compromise on 
the commandments of Islam for various reasons (e.g. Islam 
is flexible and adaptable) are praised as moderates and 
modern, whereas those holding fast to the ahkam 
[commandments] of Islam are labeled as extremists, 
radicals and backward. Regardless of the label they apply 
on us, we are only permitted to adopt thoughts and actions 
based on daleel (i.e. evidences from Qur’an and Sunnah). 
We cannot allow anyone to reshape Islam to suit their 
whims and desires. Instead we must make Islam the source 
of our thoughts and actions. (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010c)   
 After discussing how HT defines jihad and their belief in the uncreated 
nature of the Quran and therefore applicable for all peoples, places and times, HT 
takes the source of their thoughts which is the holy texts as defined by them and 
turns them into actions. They do this by defining the commandments of Islam to 
include offensive (and therefore violent jihad), the Muslim is compelled to keep 
the commandments of Islam, therefore the only logical conclusion the Muslim 
who is submitting him/herself to HT ideology is to act on offensive jihad. Given 
their belief in the offensive nature of jihad, the applicability of the holy texts for 
all peoples, places and times which includes beheading infidels and the other 
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violent passages discussed in the latter years of Muhammad, this is a dangerous 
combination and can lead to really bad behavior without a counter-narrative in its 
place. For HT and their followers, to conform the holy texts to modern society 
would be to compromise the commandments of Allah according to HT or the 
Islamist generally, but instead strictly adhere to the holy texts as interpreted by 
those closest in time to Muhammad. 
 HT claims to value and uphold the true, orthodox position and denigrate 
the modernist for “compromising” the holy texts. HT thus makes it impossible for 
the Reformer to allow for a modern interpretation of Islam and instead must 
follow the ahkam, Islamic commandments as derived from scholarly 
jurisprudence as understood by the early generations of Muslims who were close 
to Muhammad as the only acceptable form of Islam. 
 Again, HT has created the conditions as such where a Muslim who seeks 
to interpret the Shari’a by using one’s own reason and updating it for modern 
concerns is considered a collaborator with the colonialists (HT term) or the West, 
are doing dirty work and angering Allah. They make it impossible to provide 
another interpretation than the interpretations already passed down by Islamist 
scholarship that is now considered immutable. Not even a Muslim is allowed to 
interpret the Shari’a differently or HT will position them as compromising the 
commandments of Islam and therefore collaborators with unbelievers. As noted 
earlier (see page 24), HT says Muslims must initiate fighting with unbelievers 
even if the unbeliever does not attack first. HT uses a rhetorical strategy yet again 
of demonizing any Muslim who does not uphold their Islamist approach to all 
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aspects of life and accuses them of collaboration with the West, which in some 
cases is punishable by death, as we have seen with Hamas, the Palestinian arm of 
the Brotherhood (Macintyre, 2009). 
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Chapter 7 
Muslim Reformers 
The modernist approach towards Islam is to reinterpret the holy texts that 
creates a modern understanding of Islam that is indeed compatible with modernity 
and provides an intellectual framework of freedom of thought and a high 
valuation of the role of reason.  
 Reformers for the most part justify their approach to Islam as follows 
(Fuller, 2003): 
1. Allah gave mankind the powers of intellect, rationality and 
freedom of choice which he clearly intended for mankind 
to use 
2. Each individual must find their way to awareness of God 
and the message of Islam 
3. Human understanding of Allah’s message in the Quran has 
changed and grown over time but is never perfect 
4. Even though mankind will make advances in understanding 
Allah’s message and purpose, no one will ever attain a 
perfect understanding 
5. A Democratic state provides the best grounds for 
intellectual freedom which best enables individuals to 
understand Allah’s message and its relevance in modern 
society (Fuller, 2003, p. 56) 
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 Rahman (1980) provides practical applications of a Reformist approach to 
the Quran viz. an Islamist interpretation and begins with a general approach the 
modernist must take to be effective in reform. He says this approach is never 
going “beyond a certain limit in his legal reform and can only lay down certain 
moral guidelines according to which he hopes his society will evolve once it 
accepts his legal reforms” (Rahman 1980, p. 452). 
 Some practical examples include the following. Regarding polygamy, the 
Quran allows for four wives but with a moral rider that if a man was afraid of not 
treating all wives equally, then he should only have one wife. The Islamist was 
confused as to why the Quran would permit up to four wives then why include the 
moral rider? They interpreted the permission clause of marrying four wives as 
absolute but the rider a matter of private judgment for each man to determine on 
his own.  
 Modernist Muslims however in trying to abolish polygamy flipped this 
argument giving legal import to the riders and dismissed the permissive clause as 
lacking primary import. The modernist in this particular issue states the Quran 
gave permission for polygamy only under exceptional circumstances and when 
there were many war widows and orphans, thereby noting the permission was 
rooted in history, a position the Islamist would never take stating the Quran is the 
uncreated word of Allah and therefore immutable and for all peoples for all places 
and for all times regardless of historical rootedness.  
 Further, Rahman notes the interpretation of the Quran on the status of 
women and where “men are but one degree superior to women” (Quran 2:228) the 
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Islamist holds this statement as a normative statement and that although the 
female can possess and even earn money, what is spent on the household is 
always the primary concern of the male. Conversely, the Reformer “argues the 
Qur’anic statement is descriptive, that, with the inevitable change in society, 
women can and ought to become economically independent and contribute to the 
household and hence the spouses must come to enjoy absolute equality” (Rahman, 
1970, p. 453).   
 In another instance, when acting as a court witness the Quran states one 
male testimony is equal to two female testimonies. Of this, Rahman says “the 
conservative [Islamist] believes that a woman is inherently inferior to man in this 
respect” (1980, p.453). However, the Reformer claims such a statement must be 
interpreted in any given sociohistorical situation where man was at one time the 
essentially operative factor in society but that when social situations change, then 
the law must change as well. Rahman provides other examples and says the 
hesitancy by the traditionalist [Islamist] to embrace reform among other reasons is 
a fear that such legal reform is based upon a Western and therefore infidel model. 
 What I think of prime importance is the different approach to the 
interpretation of the Quran stems from the Islamist who adheres to an absolute 
unchanging interpretation for all peoples, places and times regardless of the 
historical context in which the Quran was received nor the Hadith was collected 
versus the Reformer who says one must utilize practical wisdom in each particular 
situation to determine the best interpretation. The former approach fosters 
dependence upon the interpreter versus the latter approach that allows the 
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individual Muslim to determine for themselves based upon their reason and 
understanding of holy text how best to apply it given practical issues as they arise. 
If the individual depends upon the interpretation of the trusted authority, they 
must adhere to the interpretation or risk upsetting Allah, something no Muslim by 
definition seeks to do but to be as pleasing to the Absolute as possible.   
 Abd Al-Hamid Al-Ansari, former dean of Islamic law at Qatar University 
urges Arab societies to abandon a culture of fanaticism and instead tolerate others 
in practice and not just theory, which can only be achieved by education. He says 
the social infrastructure throughout Muslim history has led young Arab men to 
love perdition and death that “suppressed, discriminated, and marginalized [both] 
Muslims and non-Muslims.”  He says, “Unfortunately, inhuman religious 
commentaries have supported them…The fanatical and discriminatory tradition - 
which contradicts Muslim principles - is the one from which some of our sons 
have drunk” (The Middle East Media Research Institute, 2009). Note that Al-
Ansari says the root problem is education by way of religious commentaries, i.e. 
theology. Thus, to change the behavior, one must change the theology of the 
educational process. If a Reformer can present an authoritative counter-narrative 
that is theologically acceptable that includes compatibility with modernity, then 
Muslims will have an alternative approach to unbelievers and will not believe 
they are compelled to initiate fighting with them.  
 Abd Al-Khaliq Hussein, an Iraqi Reformer wrote a piece in December 
2006 following Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg Address concerning the 
inconsistency of Islamists who claim tolerance meanwhile threaten to kill anyone 
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who offers any apparent criticism or merely raises questions of Islam. Hussein 
says “For this reason, the Islamic countries are considered the greatest 
crematorium for books and the greatest slaughterhouse for freethinkers in history, 
and we see that the majority of freethinkers in Arab and Islamic countries are 
either expatriates or have chosen to keep silent to remain safe.” (The Middle East 
Media Research Institute, 2007 - 
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2045.htm ). Until Reformers provide 
an authoritative, compelling counter-narrative to Islamist ideology, Islamists will 
continue on the path of pursuing a global caliphate whether through violent or 
non-violent means and ordinary Muslims will not have a choice but to follow if 
there are no opposing, authoritative views. 
 As I argue, such beliefs are critical to our discussion on very practical 
actions even in our modern age. As one example, if someone is taught that their 
eternal salvation is contingent upon killing those who do not submit to Allah as 
defined by the authority, then we do in fact see such behavior played out. As one 
example, Shahzad Faisal, who failed to detonate a car bomb on Times Square on 
May 1, 2010 believed himself a Muslim soldier and believed in a global caliphate 
as the only true form of a just society. He believed he was defending Islam and 
his Islamist brethren against America and the West 
(http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/06/22/2010-06-
22_faisal_shahzad_rage.html).  Colonel Hasan Nadal who on November 5, 2009 
murdered 13 soldiers and injured 32 others on an army base in Texas after 
attending the mosque of Anwar al-Awlaki, the same mosque that was attended by 
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two of the September 11 hijackers (CBC News, 2010). Nadal is believed to have 
visited many Islamist sites and exchanged lengthy emails with Awlaki. There are 
countless more examples including the September 11 hijackers where belief in the 
ideology of violent Islamism directly shaped their behavior.  
 One need not look very far to find the data that supports violent Islamists’ 
responsibility for the majority of terrorist attacks (Free Republic, 2008) thereby 
providing evidence that the interpretation of these texts by Islamists conveys 
individuals by stages of support: 
- the first stage of violent Islamism is sympathy with the ideology  
- the second stage includes those who provide material and emotional support to 
the cause 
- the last stage is individuals who commit terrorist acts (see page 28).  
Further, Islamism has been the dominant discourse for decades in many Muslim 
and Arab countries and does have theological backing by Islamic religious leaders 
on a large scale. In many cases Islamists hold legislative offices and serve as the 
minority party opposition in several Muslim or Arab countries. 
American Islamic Forum for Democracy  
 The American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) was founded by Dr. 
Zuhdi Jasser, a Phoenix doctor in nuclear medicine and former president and 
current board member of the Arizona Medical Association whose family is from 
Syria. Dr. Jasser is extremely prolific in his commentary on Islamism, Islamic 
Reformation and current issues. His organization is devoted to provide 
commentary and scholarship that articulates an understanding of Islam that 
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separates religion and state and is in complete harmony with the United States 
Constitution. 
 Jasser says there are two primary transitions to indoctrinate someone into 
what he refers to as a jihadist, what I refer to as Islamism. He says the first step is 
supporting through advocacy such conveyor groups as HT or others like it and 
seeking after global political Islam, a global caliphate. The second phase is 
actually the perpetration of violence. Note that although Hamas considers itself 
the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas is responsible for much 
violence and terror attacks, so I do not include Hamas under the umbrella of non-
violent Islamism.  In concurrence with this theory is Kuwaiti columnist Khalil 
‘Ali Haydar who says it is the above ground, or the so-called conveyor belt 
groups that allows for the grounds that allows individuals to go from non-violent 
Islamism to violent Islamism. He says “What makes the task of the clandestine 
terrorist groups easier is the brainwashing that has been carried out by the above-
ground political Islamist groups for over … half a century …. Thus, the terrorist 
groups are not treading through rough paths” (The Middle East Media Research 
Institute, 2007b - http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2194.htm). Of 
course, one of the most prominent above ground Islamist groups is HT. 
 Jasser sees this struggle not as Islam versus the West, but Islamism versus 
Islam. He claims, “The real jihad in 2010 is within the House of Islam against the 
Islamists and those advocates of political Islam and its radical manifestations that 
have hijacked the spiritual path of Islam” (Jasser, 2010 - 
http://bigpeace.com/mzjasser/2010/07/22/a-muslim-soldier/). 
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 Jasser is also featured prominently in a documentary produced for PBS 
titled Islam versus Islamism: Muslims Against Jihad (2008). Ahmad Shqeirat, the 
imam of the Tempe, Arizona Islamic Community Center who is interviewed in 
the documentary says a majority of Muslims in America do not agree with 
American foreign policy and that it is unfair and a bias of policy against Islam and 
Muslims.  
 Jasser does not believe imams should be using their messages to discuss 
foreign policy but instead believes in a strict separation of mosque and state. Most 
Reformers would agree that the mosque is not the place to criticize U.S. foreign 
policy or to inject politics into the sermons but to merely emphasize ones personal 
relationship with Allah. In 2004, Jasser held a rally in Phoenix titled Muslims 
Against Terror. He approached the Muslim community in Phoenix and they 
would not support it. Jasser says “The cancer that is within our community is a 
minority of a minority that are radicalized or violent. If we hand them the mantle 
of religion they seek to exploit for their own geopolitical issues all across the 
globe, then we are really going to lose this war.” 
 Shqeirat (PBS, 2008) disagrees with Jasser saying he does not believe the 
establishment of an Islamic state is a threat to anybody and that implementing 
Shari’a law in civil life was a positive experience. Further, Shqeirat claims the 
majority of Muslims in any country whenever they can vote or choose will choose 
to be governed by Islamic law, which he considers the mainstream view versus 
what he considers the extremist view. Shqeirat thinks he is mainstream and Dr. 
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Jasser is an extremist liberal. This depends upon perspective, and the belief in 
separation of mosque and state is considered an extremist view for an Islamist.  
The Quilliam Foundation 
 Quilliam in particular has been at the forefront in the United Kingdom in 
confronting the ideology of Islamism that emanates from groups like HT. 
Quilliam is self-described as “the world’s first counter-extremism think tank…to 
counter the Islamist ideology behind terrorism” (James, 2009, introductory 
description). They have devoted much time to publishing and conducting 
interviews on Islamism, a possible Islamic Reformation and the various 
ideologies that support Islamists. Their organization exists to educate the public, 
the government, the media and others on how to stem what they refer to as 
Islamic extremism, Islamism. Two former members of HT lead their organization 
(E. Hussain, 2010).  
 Ed Husain, co-founder of the Quilliam Foundation in the Times says 
Muslims must move beyond Medieval laws and criticizes Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan and Sudan for taking a “harsh, literalist” approach to the Shari’a and 
stoning women for alleged adultery. Husein says they draw their support from 
hardline male clerics who draw rulings from medieval textbooks that have no 
place in the modern world. “This clerical opposition to modernity stems from a 
crisis of scholarship within contemporary Islam, an institutional failure to 
understand religious text within a twenty-first century context.” Husein says this 
paralysis has led to clerical silence on Iran’s desire to stone a 40-year-old woman 
for alleged adultery and even though the Muslim scholars he has talked to in 
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private who disagree with the practice of stoning fail to say so publicly, as they do 
not want to lose their scholarly credentials among their more conservative peers 
(E. Hussain, 2010) 
 In response to this article, two Islamic forums – Ummah Online and Islamic 
Awakening have contributors who have no qualms with calling Husein an 
unbeliever thus seeking to undercut the entire thrust of the article. A sampling of 
comments include the following:  
Khalid_88: Ed Hussain is just another hypocritical 
opportunist. Why [sic] anyone pays any attention to what he says I 
may never understand. He is not muslim and does not represent 
Islam. He pretends to be muslim so he can write garbage on how 
"we muslim" should reform Islam and makes lots of money doing 
it. If he came out of the "I'm a muslim" closet no one would care 
what he has to say and he would be labelled an Islamaphobe. But 
then he would lose his fame and money. (Islamic Awakening, 
2010) 
 
s@z: ed, what edward, is this guy even a Muslim? 
ahaneefah: he claims to be one 
dawud_uk: then he is a liar as well as a murtad [apostate 
traitor]. (Ummah Forum, 2010) 
Interestingly, anyone who makes a post in defense of Husein or attacking those 
attacking Husein are labeled as Quilliam folks. As if no true Muslim would ever 
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make such an argument independently unless they were affiliated with Quilliam. 
This makes it convenient not to engage with the argument but to merely dismiss it 
from the outset. What is of note is the immediate dismissal of Ed Husain as a true 
Muslim would never say or do such things on an Islamist perspective. This 
rhetorical and discursive approach can therefore attack the man instead of 
examining whether what Husein says is true. What this shows is in principle, 
these and other critics of Quilliam employ the same tactic as HT and argue 
anyone who criticizes Islamism is therefore not even a believer and therefore can 
be summarily dismissed. This makes it difficult for the Reformer to even begin 
the argument as they are undermined from the outset and have to justify their 
Muslim identity. By defining who is a Muslim, these contributors to this website 
and HT can control the discourse, which raises the dilemma of the need for an 
authoritative counter-narrative where Muslims like Ed Husein can raise such 
questions without being labeled a non-Muslim. 
 I have reached out to Quilliam on what such a criticism would entail or if 
they could point me in the right direction but have yet to hear from them. Of 
course, one must first know the teachings of Islamism before one can counter it, 
but I am untrained in Islamic jurisprudence, so it would behoove me to find an 
organization like this that could better equip someone with the knowledge to 
provide counter claims.  
 Quilliam and AIFD are not the only organizations along with individual 
Reformers. Dr. Muhammad Qadri (2010) is a Reformer and published a 90-page 
piece originally written in Arabic titled Fatwa on suicide bombings and terrorism 
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and I would include as part of the “curriculum” that comes from within Muslim 
society that counters the Islamist narrative. Dr. Qadri is the founding leader of 
Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International (MQI), an organization that is located in more 
than 90 countries in the world and works for “the promotion of peace and 
harmony between communities and the revival of spiritual endeavour based on 
the true teachings of Islam” (http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/8718/A-Profile-
of-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-Muhammad-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html) 
 He wrote this piece with two purposes in mind. First, he wanted to remove 
the charge against Muslims and Muslim scholars in particular that they do not do 
enough to condemn terrorist attacks and second, to provide crystal clear 
injunctions for the impressionable Muslim youth from extremism and radicalism. 
 Dr. Qadri says the killing of Muslims and the perpetration of terrorism are 
unlawful, forbidden and makes one an unbeliever. He says, “Through reference to 
the expositions and opinions of jurists and experts of exegeses and Hadith, it has 
been established that all the learned authorities have held the same opinion about 
terrorism in the 1400 year history of Islam” that terrorism is unlawful and 
forbidden in Islam (Ul-Islam & Tahir-Ul-Qadri, 2010, p. 30). 
 Similar to Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg address, Dr. Qadri says that 
forcing one’s religion upon another is wrong and that one can only use persuasion 
as the means to convince another of the truth of Islam. Meanwhile he condemns 
violent Islamism in the process and says 
Islam has kept the door of negotiation and discussion open to 
convince by reasoning, instead of the taking up of arms to declare 
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the standpoint of others as wrong, and enforcing one’s own 
opinion. Only the victims of ignorance, jealousy and malice go for 
militancy. Islam declares them rebels. They will abide in Hell. (Ul-
Islam & Tahir-Ul-Qadri, 2010, p .36) 
 Farr (2008) confirms that the point that the refutation of Islamism must 
come from within Islam. He says 
The difficult task of containing radical Islam requires altering the 
theological (italics by author) dynamic that sustains it, a task that 
can be accomplished only by Muslims themselves. External actors 
can have an influence on this process, but no agenda is likely to 
succeed if it ignores the theologies that drive political culture in the 
lands of Islam - theologies that already provide the poison that 
sustains radicalism, and must provide its antidote as well. In short, 
only liberal democratic political Islam can defeat radical Islam. 
(Farr, 2008, p. 25) 
 Another organization that has analyzed Islamism and radicalization is The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a think tank located in 
Washington D.C. They compile a report for recommendations to the current 
Administration every year and in 2009 delivered this report to the Obama White 
House on U.S. policy viz. violent Islamism. They note as non-affiliate terrorist 
actors increase and al-Qaeda’s core strength is diminishing the United States is at 
war with a larger enemy, namely, the extremist ideology that fuels and supports 
Islamist violence. “Unfortunately, the United States is not well equipped to fight 
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on this ideological battleground, and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology 
worldwide have not kept pace with more successful military targeting of high-
level al-Qaeda leaders” 
(http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=332). If accurate, 
then it seems the solution is indeed that if one disproves and discredits the 
ideology that fuels such toxic behavior, one can prevent future generations from 
getting involved with extremism and instead provide a positive counter-narrative. 
 To successfully defeat Islamist terrorism at its most fundamental source, the 
same WINEP report argues that, rather than avoid any mention of the religious 
motivation behind the terrorism of al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, 
the Obama administration should sharpen the distinction between the 
religion of Islam and the political ideology of radical Islamism” (bold added 
for emphasis). The report has core, structural, strategic and functional 
recommendations, all of which include at some point countering the intellectual 
narrative that creates some of the conditions that allows for violent Islamism.  
 WINEP also hosted Ambassador Daniel Benjamin to address some 
methods on confronting the radical ideology of al Qaeda. Like Quilliam and the 
AIFD, he too says the Islamist narrative must be countered and thus prevent the 
radicalization of vulnerable or alienated individuals. Although al Qaeda’s support 
has declined due to their indiscriminate targeting of Muslim civilians, Benjamin 
says it is not enough to merely wait out al Qaeda and hope for the best; however, 
credible, local voices from within the respective Muslim communities must take 
the lead in presenting counter-narratives that discredits violent Islamism.  
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 Benjamin says the United States will not be the most credible source in 
countering the narrative but lists ways the U.S. can indeed help out including 
working to identify reliable partners and amplify legitimate voices. 
The United States can help empower these local actors through 
programmatic assistance, funding, or by simply providing them 
with space – physical or electronic – to challenge violent extremist 
views. Non-traditional actors such as NGOs, foundations, public-
private partnerships, and private businesses are some of the most 
capable and credible partners in local communities. The U.S. 
government and partner nations are also seeking to develop greater 
understanding of the linkages between Diaspora communities and 
ancestral homelands. Through familial and business networks, 
events that affect one community have an impact on the other. 
(Benjamin, 2010, p.6)  
Note, two major themes emerge in all of Benjamin’s recommendations that I have 
argued throughout – countering the ideological foundation of Islamism, and the 
sources of such claims must come from within Islam and not without.  
 Egyptian diplomat Ashraf Mohsin who deals with counter terrorism says 
If you want to rob these people of their cover you have to take 
away their legitimacy …. The way to deprive them of their ability 
to recruit is to attack the message. If you take Islam out of the 
message all that is left is criminality. (Black, 2007 - 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/27/alqaida.egypt) 
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By utilizing former Islamists to use Islamic jurisprudence to attack the message as 
Dr. Fadl has done and going further than he did by replacing it with a counter-
narrative, you take away the inspiration for violent Islamism and give those 
within and without of violent Islamism another space to operate. 
Reformist versus Islamist tenets for Muslim Identity 
 I would be remiss without at least touching upon the issue of Muslim 
identity and what are the essential, necessary components of being a Muslim. 
Hasan (1995) says it is assumed that orthodox [Islam] represents true Islam and 
the interests of its adherents. That liberal and modernist trends are secondary to 
the more dominant ‘separatist’, ‘communal’ and ‘neo-fundamentalist’ paradigms. 
This has a substantial impact for the average Muslim on the street, Muslim 
leaders, policymakers and non-Muslim governments and drives the discussion and 
practices. If one cannot be a true Muslim and a Reformer (modernist), then one 
cannot speak for Muslims and therefore can contribute little, if anything to 
shaping public opinion and therefore action.  
 Dr. Jasser believes Muslims should not open a debate on who is and who 
is not a Muslim as it empowers a theological hierarchy and a person’s Muslim or 
Islamic identity is between them and God. He does however call the actions of 
violent Islamists as evil and barbaric. He says 
These thugs [violent Islamists] spread an evil in the name of a 
warped version of the faith they believe in Islam; however, I 
become like ‘al Qaeda’ if I refuse to call them ‘Muslim’ and 
commit takfir (determining who is and who is not a Muslim) by 
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saying they are not ‘Muslim.’ (Lopez, 2007 - 
http://www.mzuhdijasser.com/3306/a-muslim-american) 
Not many Reformers would have a problem with submitting to Allah in all things. 
What they will disagree with Islamists on is what the system of rules (Shari’a) 
looks like in practice. The question that must always be asked is a true Muslim 
must submit their actions to Allah as defined by whom? This is the point where 
the Reformer and the Islamist have much at variance. Further, this is why 
hermeneutics is so critical, because whoever can define and therefore control the 
discourse on what it means to be a true Muslim has much power over other 
Muslims and has a very real impact upon every day actions. 
 Arkoun (2003) says that what he refers to as Islamic revivalism, aka 
Islamism and its real or perceived proponents have monopolized the public 
discourse on Islam. That social scientists have ignored what Arkoun refers to as 
“the silent Islam” – “the Islam of true believers who attach more importance to 
the religious relationship with the absolute of God than to the vehement 
demonstrations of political movements” (Arkoun 2003, p.19).  He refers to the 
thinkers and intellectuals within Islam who are having great difficulties inserting 
their critical approach into a public discourse that is presently dominated by 
militant ideologies. Arkoun’s stated goal is to utilize ijtihad to separate orthodoxy, 
which is currently perceived as a militant ideology versus a way for man to 
discover the Absolute. This would allow for man to have a direct relationship with 
the Absolute without dependence upon Islamists nor the violent ideology that 
goes along with it until a counternarrative can be presented as authoritative. The 
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discourse Islamists use is that one is not considered a true Muslim unless one 
accepts the Islamist version of Islam. This contrasts with the Reformist version 
that proposes it is a way merely for the Muslim to come to a knowledge or 
experience of Allah and his truth. Thus, one can have a Muslim identity without 
adhering to Islamist ideology. 
Mayer (1987) notes there is a tendency within Muslim Middle Eastern 
countries to associate modernization and progress with the West and utilizing 
Western law with Western imperialism. To accept the former necessarily entails 
accepting the latter and from the beginning of the Westernization process, 
Muslims would denounce any Muslims who engaged with the West either 
culturally or through the borrowing of the law saying those Muslims sought to 
imitate the infidel West. Thus, any Muslim who supported Westernization was 
open to being labeled a traitor to Islam. Mayer says “Many Muslims associated 
loyalty to Islam and traditional institutions with patriotic resistance to the 
encroachment of European influence” (Mayer, 1987, p.128).  In struggling with 
what it means to be a Muslim, Reformers have the additional burden of proving 
they are true Muslims while embracing anything previously labeled as non-
Muslim (e.g., Western).  
However, this approach by Islamists commits what is referred to as the 
genetic fallacy (2010 - http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/) Genetic fallacy is where 
one seeks to discredit a claim simply due to the origin of the argument instead of 
actually engaging with the argument. For example, if Bill Clinton gave me marital 
advice, I would have to examine the truth-value of his claim regardless of the 
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source of the claim. As such, attempts to discredit anything coming out of the 
West through appeals to its western origin regardless of its content or whether it is 
true or beneficial for society commits genetic fallacy. The Islamist says a thing is 
untrue simply because it originated from the West instead of asking the question 
if it is true. Islamists can thus simply discredit anything a Reformer says by 
simply attacking the source of the claim versus the claim itself. Of course, as a 
rhetorical device, Reformers can use the same approach. However, in my reading 
of key Reformist authors I have seen most focus on the substance of the 
arguments proposed by Islamists and rarely if ever simply discredit them based 
upon where the claims originated from. Instead of attacking the source of the 
argument (Islamists), Reformers could merely present a strong counternarrative. 
However, it seems if Reformers wanted to be perceived as having an authoritative 
alternative they would do well to attack the source of the argument and denounce 
the individual in addition to the argument itself. While they could be perceived as 
being just as guilty of committing the genetic fallacy as Islamists, they would not 
need to merely stop at only denouncing the source of the argument but can and 
should effectively counter the Islamist argument as well provide a positive 
counternarrative in its place. When voters decide to vote for a new candidate they 
must make two choices - to vote for the new candidate but also to vote against the 
incumbent. The same principle seems to apply here where the Reformer must not 
only provide a positive reason to “vote” for them, but also to provide a negative 
reason to “vote” against the Islamist. 
123 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
I am unable to provide a solution to all the problems in the Middle East 
with this one narrow slice yet I believe this contributes to a piece of the solution. 
As I have noted there are many economic, political, military, and socio-cultural 
problems that permeate the complexity of this issue, however my approach to 
violent Islamism as a communication studies student has been a focus on the 
rhetoric and the ideology that fuels that rhetoric and, therefore, impacts 
understandings and outcomes. Certainly it will take more than rhetoric to solve 
the many complicated issues in the region yet we have to begin somewhere. I 
began with ideology as the one variable I can impact, so independent of 
economic, political, military and cultural issues, I investigated ideology and the 
manner with which it is communicated. I would like to see as one practical 
solution a point-by-point refutation from the holy texts that demonstrate 
authoritatively Muslims can maintain their religious identity within modernity as 
opposed to a criticism of al Qaeda ideology solely. As noted at the end of the 
previous chapter, Reformers would do well to attack the Islamists, refute point by 
point their ideology and provide an authoritative counternarrative in its place.  
Both the Quilliam Foundation (Quilliam Foundation, 2008) and AIFD 
have stated the need for what I refer to as a counter-narrative and the need to 
refute Islamist ideology that calls for a caliphate. What is lacking is the actual 
curriculum. Certainly there are those within both organizations who can refute 
each charge as they come in, point by point; however, there must be a systematic 
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refutation – both scholarly and popular for the general public. Regardless of 
where one’s sympathies lie, this ought to be done if only to provide a different 
perspective, so one is not forced to choose between an Arab dictator or an Islamist 
organization and that there is indeed a third option. I have reached out to the 
Quilliam foundation to see if any such curriculum exists but they have yet to 
provide any feedback or at the very least point me in the right direction.  
Such a curriculum should be available in Arabic, Farsi and English in both 
written form and websites and should be comprehensive, authoritative, 
compelling and should come from within the Muslim community. So, I would 
like to see as one practical solution a point by point refutation from the holy texts 
demonstrating authoritatively that Muslims can maintain their religious identity 
within modernity and not a criticism of Islamist ideology only. So, instead of 
merely telling violent Islamists they are wrong, Muslim Reformers can show 
Muslim American youth through their own holy texts they are in error with this 
message mediated by Reformers. I intend on working with Reformers and the 
education community to develop such a curriculum and work with them so they 
can provide a much-needed solution to a problem that can have real life impact if 
done well.
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